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I. THE SYSTEM OF CYCLES 
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Interaction between Kondratieff Waves 
and Juglar Cycles* 
 
Leonid E. Grinin and Andrey V. Korotayev 
 
Abstract 
Some important correlations between medium-term economic cycles (7–
11 years) known as Juglar cycles and long (40–60 years) Kondratieff cycles 
are presented in this paper. The research into the history of this issue shows 
that this aspect is insufficiently studied. Meanwhile, in our opinion, it can sig-
nificantly clarify both the reasons of alternation of upswing and downswing 
phases in K-waves and the reasons of relative stability of the length of these 
waves. It also can provide the certain means for forecasting. The authors show 
that adjacent 2–4 medium cycles form the system the important characteristic 
of which is the dynamics of economic trend. The latter can be upswing (active) 
or downswing (depressive). The mechanisms of formation of such medium-term 
trends and changing tendencies are explained. The presence of such clusters of 
medium cycles (general duration of which is 20–30 years) determines to 
a large degree the long-wave dynamics and the characteristics of its timing. 
Thus, not medium-term J-cycles depend on the character of K-wave phase as 
Kondratieff supposed, but the character of the cluster of J-cycles determines 
significantly the character of K-wave phases. 
Keywords: medium-term cycles, Juglar cycles, long cycles of Kondratieff, long 
waves, downswing phase, upswing phase, crisis, resources, business strategies, 
generations of businessmen. 
Introductory Notes   
‘It appears that crises, like diseases, are one of the conditions of the existence 
of those societies where trade and industry are prevalent. One can predict them, 
alleviate them, delay them up to a certain moment, one can facilitate the recovery 
                                                          
* This research has been supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Project No 14-11-00634) 
and implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University 
Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2015.  
Interaction between Kondratieff Waves and Juglar Cycles 26
of economic activities; but it has turned to be impossible to eliminate them not-
withstanding all the possible methods that have been applied’. Unfortunately, 
those well-forgotten words of Clement Juglar (1862: VII), who was one of  
the first to demonstrate that economic crises follow the periodical/cyclical pat-
tern, became very relevant again in 2008, that is about 150 years after they had 
been written.  
We will start this article with our analysis of the main features of medium-
term cycles of business activity, or business cycles (7–11 years)1 that are also 
known as Juglar cycles after the prominent 19th-century French economist 
Clement Juglar (1819–1905), who investigated these cycles in detail (Idem 
1862, 1889).2 
Juglar investigated fluctuations of prices, discount rates and gold reserves 
of banks in France, England, and the USA and showed their correlation with 
cycles of increasing business activity, investments (and speculations), and em-
ployment (Ibid.).The first edition of his book was published in 1862. Juglar's 
most important achievement lay in presenting substantial evidence that crises 
were periodical, that is in support of ‘the law of crises' periodicity’. According to 
this law, crisis is preceded by epochs of recovery, well-being, and price increases, 
which are followed by years of price decrease and trade slowing down that bring 
economy into a depressed state (Idem 1889: xv). The transition of economics as a 
whole from crisis theory to business-cycle theory is frequently connected (Be-
somi 2005: 1) with Juglar's contribution to analysis of periodical crises. Thus, 
crisis does not occur randomly (it is erroneous to ascribe its occurrence to ran-
dom factors).3 It is preceded by an intensive increase in business activities and 
prices, which sometimes allows one to predict a crisis in advance.4 According 
to Tugan-Baranovsky (2008 [1913]: 294), Juglar successfully coped with this 
task on a number of occasions.  
                                                          
1 Many economists maintain that business cycles are quite regular with the characteristic period of 
7–11 years. However, some suggest that economic cycles are irregular (see, e.g., Fischer et al. 
1988). As we suppose, comparative regularity of business cycles is observed rather at the World 
System scale than in every country taken separately. This corroborates the important role of ex-
ogenous factors for the rise and progress of business cycles (for more details see below).  
2 Medium-term cycles (7–11 years) were first named after Juglar in works by Joseph Schumpeter, 
who developed the typology of different-length business-cycles (Schumpeter 1939, 1954; see also 
Kwasniсki 2008). 
3 Notwithstanding the belief of some influential modern economists in the contrary (see, e.g., Zar-
nowitz 1985: 544–568; Mankiw 2008: 740).  
4 It is worth mentioning here that, before Juglar, prevailing views were based on Adam Smith's 
ideas of ‘invisible hand’ and on Say's law of markets. According to such views, equilibrium state 
is considered to be the main one for the market, various shifts from it being caused by some ex-
ternal factors. Consequently, crises are also caused by random factors. However, currently these 
ideas (those of external shocks) are rather popular again. We will consider this issue in more de-
tail further on.  
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A few notes on Juglar cycles (which will be also denoted as J-cycles be-
low). Let us turn to a brief description by Tugan-Baranovsky of the economic 
cycle scheme proposed by Juglar:  
‘Industrial crisis never comes unexpectedly: it is always preceded by a 
special heated state of industry and trade whose symptoms are so specif-
ic that an industrial crisis may be forecasted in advance… What causes 
these regular changes of booms and busts? Juglar indicates one main 
cause: periodic fluctuations of commodity prices. The prosperous epoch 
that precedes the crisis is always characterized by the growth of prices: 
“Annual savings of civilized nations (that enlarge their wealth) also lead 
and sustain the constant growth of prices: this is a natural state of the 
market, a prosperous period. The crisis approaches when the upward 
movement slows down; the crisis starts when it stops… The main cause 
(one may even say – the only cause) of the crises is the interruption of 
the growth of prices” (Juglar 1889: 33). The overall mechanism of the 
crisis development is specified by Juglar in the following way. The in-
crease in commodity prices naturally tends to impede the sales of respec-
tive commodities. That is why with the growth of prices the foreign trade 
balance becomes less and less favorable for the respective country. 
The gold starts to move abroad to pay for the imports whose amounts 
start to exceed those of exports. At the beginning the amounts of gold 
moving abroad are negligible and nobody pays attention to this. Howev-
er, the higher the prices, the greater the amount of gold that moves 
abroad. Finally, the commodity prices reach such a high level that selling 
the respective goods abroad becomes highly problematic. As the traders 
cannot cover the import expenses with the export revenues, they have to 
renew their promissory notes in banks after the payment deadline, and 
this accounts for the intensification of the discounting operations of the 
banks in the period that directly precedes the crisis. Yet, the payments 
cannot be delayed forever; sooner or later they should be made. 
The commodity prices fall immediately, this is followed by bankruptcies 
of banks and traders, and the industrial crisis begins’ (Tugan-
Baranovsky 2008 [1913]: 294–295).  
It can be seen that the central mechanism of cyclical fluctuations, in Juglar's opin-
ion, is the fluctuation of prices, their increase leading to recovery and upswing, 
their decrease being followed by crisis and depression. The exceptionally im-
portant role of price fluctuations is indisputable; it has been noticed by econo-
mists belonging to various schools (see, e.g., Haberler 1964 [1937]). Among 
them one can mention such contemporaries of Juglar as Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels. In Tugan-Baranovsky's opinion (Tugan-Baranovsky 2008 [1913]), with 
which we are ready to agree, Juglar's theory, however, does not explain adequate-
ly enough the main point, namely the increase in commodity prices in the period 
that precedes the crisis. Subsequent researchers described numerous mechanisms 
of such an increase, ranging from interest rate fluctuation, credit expansion and 
reinvestment to the behavior of aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves, 
as well as psychological factors such as ungrounded optimism. Nevertheless, 
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the issue is still subject to vigorous academic discussions. Tugan-Baranovsky 
himself suggests that crises are caused by a lack of capital, as in the upswing pe-
riod capital is spent faster than it is accumulated. As a result, both credit and im-
pulse to development are exhausted, while structural disproportions lead to crisis 
phenomena (not necessarily in the form of an acute crisis; he was right in stating 
that the crisis intensity depends on the intensity of upswing). Tugan-Baranovsky 
emphasizes (and we would agree with him on this point to a certain degree) that 
the school of Marx and Engels suggested the deepest understanding of crisis for 
their time. According to them, crises are caused by over-production (which is a 
consequence of the main contradiction of capitalism). Overproduction itself is 
stipulated, first of all, by the anarchic character of capitalist production; secondly, 
by poverty of the masses, their exploitation, and the tendency of salaries to de-
crease. As a consequence of constant growth of capital's organic structure  
(i.e. the decline of the proportion of salaries in total production expenses), accord-
ing to Marx, the profit rate falls.5 Capitalists try to overcome the profit rate re-
duction by introducing new machines, which leads to labor productivity 
growth. This leads to the expansion of the commodities' supply and, conse-
quently, to their overproduction (because of the ‘anarchy’ of capitalistic pro-
duction). Then crisis is the explosion of contradictions of capitalistic produc-
tion, and, consequently, the restoration of equilibrium. Some Marxist econo-
mists provided fundamental descriptions of the history of crises (see, e.g., 
Mendelson 1959–1964; Varga 1937; Trakhtenberg 1963 [1939]). However, 
Marx and Engels, in our view, did not manage to show the true connection be-
tween processes of production and circulation (the latter were ignored as an 
allegedly less fundamental part). Thus, they were not capable of revealing 
the causes of the explosiveness of crises and dramatic changes at so-called turn-
ing points (i.e., from boom to acute crisis and from bust to recovery and boom).  
In the first half of the 20th century, numerous theories explaining economic 
cycles were already present. In fact, the under-consumption theory was one of the 
oldest, emerging a long time ago (actually, together with the science of political 
economy itself). Among its earliest followers, Lord James Lauderdale, Thomas 
Malthus and Jean Sismondi were the most prominent. In the first half of the 
20th century, a significant contribution to scientific re-consideration and diffu-
sion of the under-consumption theory was made by John Atkinson Hobson, 
William Foster, Waddill Catchings, Emil Lederer. Essentially concordant with 
its ideas were some of the abovementioned approaches of the Marxist orthodox 
school, which assumed that the conditions of the working class, according to 
the law of absolute impoverishment put forward by Marx, must worsen.6 
                                                          
5 Phenomenon marked by economists of various schools but explained differently. 
6 However, such explanation has become an anachronism long ago. The given theory correlates 
very badly indeed with a long-term trend to an unprecedentedly fast (against the general historical 
background) increase in life standards (and real incomes) of ‘direct producers’ in general, and the 
‘working class’ in particular. This trend is rather typical for ‘capitalist’ countries and is observed 
in reality.  
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Monetary theories saw causes of cyclicity mainly in the cumulative character of 
the expansion and contraction of business activities depending on the available 
amounts of money in the economy.7 The most vivid example is Hawtrey's theo-
ry (see, e.g., Hawtrey 1926, 1928). For him, trade-industrial crises appeared to 
be purely monetary phenomena, as, in his opinion, the changes of monetary flow 
suffice to explain the transitions from upswings to depressions (and vice versa). 
On the whole, undoubtedly, the monetary component of cyclicity and crises is 
very important. However, representatives of monetary theories attributed a too 
dominant  role to monetary factors, thus ignoring non-monetary causes.  
One of the versions of the theory of over-accumulation is based on the ideas 
of Tugan-Baranovsky. Haberler (1964 [1937]) divides representatives of the 
theory into followers of its monetary and non-monetary versions. The first 
group includes those economists who suggest that monetary factors, acquiring 
great importance with credit expansion, cause strong disproportions between 
those  economic sectors producing consumer goods and those producing capital 
goods (or, more exactly, between the sectors of the manufacturing chain). 
The followers of this version of the theory have made a particularly valuable con-
tribution to the analysis of disproportions in production structure caused by the 
credit expansion during the phase of boom and prosperity, as well as to the inter-
pretation of crisis as a result of those disproportions. Representatives of this direc-
tion include Friedrich von Hayek, Fritz Machlup, Lionel Robbins, Wilhelm 
Roepke, and Richard von Strigl. Numerous representatives of this direction 
belong to the so-called Austrian School, which started from the works by Lud-
wig von Mises (1981 [1912], 2005). The representatives of the Austrian School 
see the most important cause of crises in state interference into economic pro-
cesses, particularly the artificial credit expansion. Special attention is given to 
the role of central banks as mechanisms generating crises (see, e.g., Huerta de 
Soto 2006; Skousen 1993; Rothbard 1969; Shostak 2002; Kuryaev 2005).8 
The other, non-monetary direction of over-accumulation theory is represented 
by the authors whose theories are based on taking non-monetary factors into ac-
count: inventions, discoveries, creation of new markets, etc., that is the factors 
securing favorable conditions for new investments. This direction is represented 
by Gustav Cassel, Peter Hansen, Arthur Spiethoff, and Knut Wicksell. Works 
                                                          
7 It should be noted that, from the point of view of General Systems Theory, this point is essentially 
related to the issue of positive feedback loops, which will be considered in more detail further on. 
The action of these feedbacks can lead to phenomena perceived as ‘booms’, ‘collapses’, and 
‘breakdowns’ (see, e.g., Sornette 2003).  
8 As a separate direction, a group of economists may be specified who developed the so-called 
‘acceleration principle’. According to this principle, the changes in consumer goods production 
cause, due to technological reasons, much sharper fluctuations in production goods sector, as in-
vestments into main capital require much more time and expenses. This causes a general demand 
increase, which eventually turns out to be greater than required for optimal development, which 
creates prerequisites for crisis origin (see, e.g., Haberler 1964 [1937]).  
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by Arthur Pigou and Joseph Schumpeter are also essentially close to this direc-
tion.  
Psychological theories are also worth mentioning. Even though every eco-
nomic phenomenon has its psychological aspect, some theories (not without 
reason) when interpreting different cycle phases assign a special importance to 
‘psychological reaction’ that can considerably increase disproportions, make 
a new phase occur faster or slower, contribute to business activity increase or 
hinder it, etc. Among the representatives of psychological theory, one may 
mention such prominent economists as, for example, John Keynes, Frederick 
Lavington, Arthur Pigou, and Frank Taussig. In some aspects they ascribe to 
psychological factors (such as optimism, pessimism, euphoria, panic) 
a relatively independent impact (for more details see Grinin 2009c).  
Theories of economic crises can be classified in a variety of ways. For ex-
ample, they can be segregated into exogenous and endogenous ones (see, e.g., 
Morgan 1991), which is closely connected with approaches to the explanation 
of the nature of an equilibrium in economy. We take it as a basis that, though 
cyclicity has an endogenous structure being connected to occurrence of struc-
tural disproportions, yet crises cannot occur without some exogenous impacts. 
Essentially, the economy of a given country cannot be regarded in an isolated 
way, as the economic field is always much broader than the one of an isolated 
economy. It serves as part of the World System economic field, so in reality 
external impacts must necessarily be observed (see for more details Grinin and 
Korotayev  2012). The following important aspect must also be taken into con-
sideration: while crisis in a given country may have first of all an endogenous 
character, its process and characteristics may possess substantial peculiarities in 
comparison to crisis in countries where it is caused by exogenous factors. 
In particular, under modern conditions many countries – as for example, China, 
India, or Russia – have not exhausted their resources for development. Crisis in 
these countries occurred just under the influence of a sharp change of external 
conditions. And, as external conditions of every country form a unique combina-
tion, crisis would have important peculiarities in each particular case. At the same 
time, in the USA the crisis was more of endogenous character, as the country's 
economic resources had been worn out to a greater extent than that in many de-
veloping countries. Such a situation is generally (though, of course, not always) 
typical for the development of crises in the core of the World System, on the 
one hand, and in its periphery, on the other. In the center, crises have a more 
endogenous character, while in the periphery their origins are usually more 
exogenous, as they tend to be caused by economic fluctuations in the center 
(Grinin and Korotayev 2010a, 2010b). Thus, every crisis has always both en-
dogenous and exogenous causes, but their combination is specific for each par-
ticular society in every particular period, which makes the situation unique for 
any society and any crisis.  
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Kondratieff (2002: 11–14) divided all approaches firstly into ones regarding 
economic phenomena as static, considering static equilibrium state in economy as 
basic, and all deviations from such equilibrium as disturbances. Among the fol-
lowers of this approach Kondratieff named William Jevons, Leon Walras, 
Vilfredo Pareto, Gregory Clark, Alfred Marshall, Knut Wicksell, etc. Secondly, 
in Kondratieff's view, the researches of some other economists were oriented 
mostly at the study of economic dynamics. These economists state that the equi-
librium is not a basic condition; they may even consider it as random, whereas, 
according to them, the economic dynamics go through a whole range of regular 
development phases. Among those economists Kondratieff mentions Karl 
Marx, Clement Juglar, Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, Arthur Spiethoff, Jean Les-
cure, Albert Aftalion, and George Mitchell. He indicates, however, that these 
researchers elaborated on particular problems of economic dynamics, their 
works stand somewhat apart from the general development of economic theory. 
Nevertheless, it should be added that these researchers made an especially im-
portant contribution to the development of the economic cycle theory.  
As regards the above-mentioned division, it should be noted that, in the 
view of some economists, the essence of Keynesian Revolution is in Keynes' 
ideas (1978 [1936]) destroying the belief in perfect inner regulatory forces of 
market mechanisms (Adam Smith's ‘invisible hand’ [see Smith 1935]), which 
meant the true end of the laissez-faire doctrine (see, e.g., Blaug 1985). The dis-
cussions between the Keynesians and Neoclassicists are mainly centered on the 
question whether economy possesses self-regulating forces.9 Classical theory 
pays particular attention to long-term economic growth, dwarfing the meaning 
of economic cycles. Keynesians insist that crisis-less economy growth is only 
possible in the presence of adequate monetary and fiscal policies playing the 
role of countercyclical stabilizers. In other words, Keynesians maintain that eco-
nomic growth directly depends on the state's economic policy, without which 
such growth may not occur altogether. As Samuelson and Nordhaus note (Samu-
elson and Nordhaus 2009a: 486–487), in Keynesians' opinion, the economy is 
prone to lengthy periods of recurring unemployment followed by speculation and 
increasing inflation. While for a classical economist the economy is similar to a 
person leading a healthy way of life, for a Keynesian, economy is a manic-
depressive personality, periodically inclined either to boundless rage and ground-
less gaiety, or to hopeless sullenness.  
Since the 1950s, but especially from the 1970s to the 1990s, discussions 
concerning problems of cyclicity were connected with choosing the parameters 
through which economists proposed to influence it in order to diminish the 
negative consequences of uneven economic development. Expansion and de-
                                                          
9 In classical economic theory, self-regulating forces are stated to be ones connected with the be-
havior of economic agents: entrepreneurs, workers, buyers, sellers, etc., stipulated by elasticity of 
salaries and prices, which are capable of supporting the economy in a state of full employment. 
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velopment of the Keynesian theory contributed to the advancement of the idea 
about the economy's immanent proneness to falls and booms (i.e., to cycles). 
However, on the other hand, the popularity of the idea about the possibility of 
influencing cycles through state policy led to the economic thought focusing 
mainly on the ways of producing such an influence. The problems of the cycles' 
nature and their deep causes gradually shifted to the periphery of the economic 
science.  
Best-known in modern economic thought are the Keynesian (more exactly, 
neo-Keynesian) and monetary schools. The first post-war decades showed that 
the state policy of influencing economic parameters (such as aggregate demand, 
aggregate supply, discount rates, etc.) is not entirely successful. First of all, it is 
not always effective; secondly, it is not always based on long-term economic 
interests; thirdly, it has a certain lag, as necessary laws and decisions must be 
subject to a long procedure of coordination, approval, and enforcement. This 
led to growing popularity of the monetarist theory, which suggests that the state 
should exercise less direct influence on economy, while its interference must be 
more subtle and concentrate mainly on regulating money supply, money circu-
lation velocity, state debt volume, and interest rates.10 An important contribu-
tion of this school to the macroeconomic theory can be seen in developing the 
idea about the necessity of following the rules of money circulation and not 
relying on voluntary fiscal and monetary policy.  
Thus, the main difference between the views of Keynesians and monetarists 
lies in their approaches to defining aggregate demand. Keynesians suggest that 
aggregate demand changes are influenced by numerous factors, while monetar-
ists believe the main factor having impact on output and prices is the change of 
money supply. Monetarists believe that the private sector is stable, and state 
interference often simply extracts resources; macroeconomic fluctuations ap-
pear mainly because of fluctuations of money supply. In general, one can ob-
serve different views as regards the questions of which instruments should be 
used to influence the cyclicity, and what should be the role and economic poli-
cy of a state in short-term and long-term perspectives.  
However, some more radical views on direct state interference into 
the economy are also present within the neoclassical theory. One of its tenets is 
based on the so-called theory of rational expectations (Robert Emerson Lukas 
and others), which essentially suggests that, as people use all available infor-
mation, they can figure out in advance the predictable state policy and use it for 
their own benefit, as a result of which state policy turns out ineffective. Rough-
                                                          
10 It is no coincidence that dominating positions in global economic science (and practice) went 
from Keynesians to monetarists in the early 1970s at a transition period from upswing to a down-
swing phase of the 4th Kondratieff cycle. On the other hand, such position transition was stipulat-
ed by refusal from attachment to the gold standard in dollar, which led to great changes in behav-
iour of finances devoid of such an anchor.  
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ly speaking, ‘no government can outwit the taxpayers’. Neoclassicists also as-
sume price and salary flexibility (that is why the theory is called neoclassical, 
as, similar to the classical pre-Keynesian one, it is based on the idea of econo-
my self-regulation). Like monetarists, they suppose that state influence should 
concentrate mainly on indirect economy regulation via various monetary in-
struments.  
However, it is important to understand that in the last 10–15 years the pro-
cess of definite and substantial synthesis of old and new economic theories has 
been going on (for more details see Samuelson and Nordhaus 2009a: 505–
507).11 In particular, economists started paying more attention to expectations, 
as neoclassical theory suggests.  
Phases of Medium-Term Cycles of Juglar (J-cycles) 
Some modern economists single out only two main phases of the business cy-
cle: upswing and downswing (there are some other names for those phases – 
e.g., ‘expansion’ and ‘contraction’, whereas moments corresponding to the cri-
sis (emerging at the peak of the overheating) and the trough of the down-
swing/recession are interpreted as inflection points (see, e.g., Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 2009b).12 
However, it is not rare that the cycle is subdivided into four phases13 (and 
we prefer to do this within our model).  For more details on our model of the 
Juglar cycle see Grinin, Korotayev, and Malkov 2010.14 
Thus, in our model J-cycle consists of four phases:  
– recovery phase (which we could subdivide into the start sub-phase and the 
acceleration sub-phase); 
– upswing/prosperity/expansion phase (which we subdivide into the growth 
sub-phase and the boom/overheating sub-phase); 
                                                          
11 Actual synthesis of Keynesian and monetary theories started much earlier.  
12 Yet, generally speaking, the number of phases may depend on how detailed the respective analy-
sis is (as well as a number of other factors). Thus (see below), we subdivide each cycle into four 
big phases (basing ourselves on Schumpeter's approach to the distribution of cycle phases), and 
then single out eight subphases (two subphases per every phase), whereas Burns and Mitchell 
(1946) only identify two big phases (expansion and contraction) subdividing each phase into 
three subphases, and consider turning points (peak and trough) as separate short phases. Thus, 
they get eight stages too (as the ninth stage belongs actually to the next cycle).  
13 On the other hand, it appears possible to single out two sub-phases in each phase.  
14 This model takes into account a number of approaches to the analysis of such cycles that are 
specified in the publications by Juglar (1862, 1889); Lescure (1907); Marx (1961 [1893, 1894]); 
Tugan-Baranovsky (1954, 2008 [1913]); Hilferding (1981 [1910]); Mitchell (1927), Keynes 
(1978 [1936]); Varga (1937); Haberler (1964 [1937]); Mendelson (1959–1964); Minsky (1983, 
1985, 1986, 2005); Hicks (1946 [1939], 1993: 432–442); Samuelson and Nordhaus (2005: 403–
552); Schumpeter (1939); von Hayek (1931, 1933); von Mises (1981 [1912], 2005); Cassel 
(1925); Pigou (1929); Friedman (2002); Abel and Bernanke (2008a), as well as a number of other 
economists. 
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– recession phase (within which we single out the crash/bust/acute crisis 
sub-phase and the downswing sub-phase);  
– depression/stagnation phase (which we could subdivide into the stabiliza-
tion sub-phase and the breakthrough sub-phase).  
 
Fig. 1. The Model of a Juglar Cycle  
Recovery phase starts after (and as a result of) the liquidation of disproportions 
(and the establishment of new proportions) that almost inevitably take place dur-
ing preceding phases of recession and stagnation (which often lead to a signifi-
cant restructuration). That is why a new cycle starts at a new level of equilibrium 
(Schumpeter 1939). The recovery and certain growth can start because, as a 
result of the preceding downswing, excessive commodity inventories have been 
dissolved and have come into correspondence with extant demand, some unsatis-
fied demand for commodities has been formed, problematic firms have disap-
peared, bad debts and fictive capitals have been ‘burnt out’, businessmen have 
become much more cautious (see, e.g., Minsky 1983, 1985, 1986, 2005), etc. 
During the expansion phase the growth accelerates, whereas the recovery 
becomes general. The active expansion often needs some external factor (e.g., 
the emergence of some major new market). The demand for resources and 
commodities grows, investments increase in a really substantial way. This tends 
to lead to the growth of prices. The demand for credit also grows, new enter-
prises emerge, active speculations at stock and commodity exchanges take 
place. If the growth continues and becomes very fast, the economy moves to 
the boom (overheating) sub-phase, which leads to overstraining of the financial 
markets, as free liquidity is absent. As a result, prices grow very fast, ‘bubbles’ 
emerge, speculation increases. 
Recession phase. Finally, some factors interfere (e.g., a sudden drop of de-
mand or prices, a bankruptcy of a large firm, a default of some foreign state, 
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additional demand for funds in the context of worsening political situations, a 
new law that changes ‘rules of the game’); as a result one observes bust and 
acute crisis. This is accompanied by the decline of industrial production, waves 
of bankruptcies, decline of orders for various products, shut-down of many en-
terprises, explosive growth of unemployment, and so on. 
Depression phases are the periods of stagnation and very slow economic 
growth, when the economy moves from the overheating and bust, the over-
accumulated inventories are dissolved, prices decrease (though in modern times 
prices may behave in a somehow different way during this phase). The depres-
sion is the process through which the market economy gets adapted, it gets rid 
of extremes and distortions of the previous inflationary boom and restores a 
stable economic state. Within this perspective, depression turns out to be an 
unpleasant but necessary reaction to distortions and extremes of the preceding 
boom (e.g., Rothbard 1969).  
The causes of cyclical crises. Economic crisis (bust, recession, and depres-
sion) is the most dramatic part of the medium-term J-cycle. The crisis is always 
a result of the preceding active growth, because this growth inevitably produces 
structural strains not only in the economy, but in the society as a whole (as the 
current social institutions are ‘designed’ for a certain scale of phenomena and 
processes). However, notwithstanding all the similarities, every crisis, natural-
ly, has certain unique features.  
The characteristic features of classical J-cycles can be presented as follows: 
at the expansion phase they were characterized by very fast (sometimes even 
explosive) growth (boom) that involved a tremendous strain within the eco-
nomic system, which was followed by an even more impressive bust.  
The phase of expansion (that included the sub-phase of boom and overheat-
ing) was accompanied by the following phenomena:  
а) a very strong (even inadequate) growth of prices of raw materials and re-
al estate;  
b) excessive demand for credit and the expansion of the investment over 
any reasonable limits;  
c) outbreak of speculations with commodities and bonds;  
d) enormous growth of risky operations.  
All these are salient features of the Juglar cycle that have been described on 
many occasions by representatives of various schools of the economic thought. 
On the other hand, they can be easily found in the recent global economic crisis.  
Our analysis has also demonstrated that during the expansion phase a spe-
cial role is usually played by some new financial technology or some new type 
of financial assets.  
Sharp transitions from booms to busts were connected with a spontaneous 
economic development that was regulated by almost nothing except the market 
forces, as the state interference in the economic development was not sufficient. 
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Within such a context (and taking into consideration the presence of the gold 
standard) acute crises became inevitable.15 
On the Importance of Further Research  
on the Theory of J-Cycles  
After the Great Depression the interest in Juglar cycles grew sharply, and, ac-
cording to Haberler (2008: 431), there was no other period in the history of 
economic thought when the problems of economic cycles were studied so in-
tensively. However, later, in the second half of the 20th century (especially, 
during Phase A of the 4th Kondratieff Cycle), the dynamics of business cycles 
experienced a significant change (first of all as a result of the active interfer-
ence of the state into the economic life)16, recessions became less deep than 
before (whereas the crisis became less dramatic), the recovery came relatively 
fast, etc. As a result, economists began paying more attention to long waves of 
business activities (Kondratieff cycles) than to Juglar cycles, though, mostly by 
tradition, macroeconomics textbooks still tend to include a chapter on those 
cycles (yet, they are mostly denoted just as ‘business cycles’).17 We believe that 
such neglect with respect to the study of J-cycles is unproductive. In our opin-
ion, modern crisis is quite similar in type to classical Juglar's cycle crisis.  
The cyclical dynamics of Juglar type in their most pronounced form (that is, 
not smoothed by state intervention) was determined by the following factors: 
a) the presence of the gold standard in transactions within a country, as well as 
at the international level; b) uncontrolled dynamics of prices and interest rates; 
c) relatively weak interference of the state during upswings and even crises and 
recessions (though gradually such interference increased). These resulted in fast 
(sometimes even explosive) upswings (that demanded a great tension on the 
part of the economic system) and equally rapid downswings. The upswing, 
boom and overheating were accompanied by rapid and inadequate growth of 
prices of raw materials and real estate; an increase in intensity of speculations 
with commodities and stock assets; by a dramatic expansion of credit and risky 
operations; and the growth of investments beyond any reasonable limits. All 
                                                          
15 Thus, with the excessive growth of credit and swelling of financial assets, the amount of money 
substitutes (shares, bills, bonds, etc.) greatly increased. As a result, with a decrease in confidence 
in these securities a sudden demand for gold and cash increased so much that destroyed the entire 
banking system.  
16 Even some Soviet economists had to acknowledge this, e.g., Varga, a Hungarian by origin, who 
was influenced originally by the Austrian Economic School (e.g., Varga 1974: 366–400). In par-
ticular, he noticed that the depression phase had contracted in a very significant way. The change 
in crisis patterns in England since the late 19th century was first noticed by Tugan-Baranovsky 
(2008 [1913]). Mitchell also showed that, though recession is a necessary part of the cycle, not 
every cycle should be necessarily connected with an acute crisis (Mitchell 1930: 391–392). For a 
more detailed analysis of post-war cycles see Grinin and Korotayev 2012. 
17 See, e.g., Mankiw 1994: сh. 14; Sacks and Larren 1996: сh. 17; Abel and Bernanke 2008a: ch. 8, 
even though such chapters are present not in all textbooks of the kind. For example, in the text-
book by Dornbusch and Fischer (1997) such a chapter is absent.  
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these are salient features of the J-cycles that were described many times in the 
writings of representatives of various schools of economic thought (see, e.g., 
Juglar 1862, 1889; Marx 1960 [1867]; Mills 1868; Lescure (1908); Tugan-
Baranovsky 1954; Marx 1961 [1893, 1894]; Hilferding 1981 [1910]; Haberler 
1964; Keynes 1978 [1936]; Hicks 1946 [1939]; Abel and Bernanke 2008; Sam-
uelson and Nordhaus 2005, 2009b).  
Such an expansion of assets tended to lift temporarily limitations produced 
by the metallic standard. This is the reason for the fact that we observe almost 
always during the upswing phase the effect of some new financial technology 
(naturally, in addition to the old ones), or some new type of assets (e.g., in the 
19th century this could be railway shares), that could drive the credit and specu-
lations, amplifying the overheating of the economic system.18 The monetary 
component of the Juglar cycles was always exceptionally important (though this 
was the dynamics of real economy that was at the basis of cyclical upswings). 
The above indicated factors were the main ones to engender very sharp and 
vividly expressed cyclic features. However, gradually under the impact of 
the Keynesian recipes (in the framework of national economic development) it 
became possible to minimize these dramatic distortions of rises and falls and to 
put speculation under a certain control (e.g., after the Great Depression in the 
USA the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, forbidding banks, investment firms 
and insurance companies to speculate at stock exchanges [see Lan 1976; Samu-
elson and Nordhaus 2005, 2009b; Suetin 2009: 41]). This led to smoothing of 
cyclical fluctuations and to less explosive crises.19 
However, currently, the crisis has evidently overgrown national borders, 
occurring namely as an international crisis, where national norms act in an ob-
viously weakened form, while international regulations have not yet been 
worked out. That is why a number of old features recur at the new stage, be-
cause the methods of regulation applicable to separate countries would not 
work at World System scale, still more so that the rules of such regulation have 
not been worked out yet.  
We suggest that the current recurrence of some features of Juglar's cycle is 
connected namely with the following features of anarchy and arrhythmia of the 
non-regulated market economy:  
                                                          
18 For example, by the Charter of the Bank of England (as renewed in 1833), it was permissible to 
establish deposit joint stock banks everywhere. As a result, their number started growing rapidly 
which greatly contributed to the growth of capital accumulation, speculation, and at the same 
time to the accumulation of conditions for the 1836 crisis (for more detail see Tugan-Baranovsky 
2008 [1913]: 110–111). For more detail on the development of various new financial technolo-
gies from cycle to cycle see Grinin and Korotayev 2012. 
19 In 1999 in the USA the law on financial services modernization was passed, which annulled 
the Glass-Steagall Act that was in force for more than 60 years (see Suetin 2009: 41). As a basis for 
introducing the law on financial services modernization, it has been claimed that American credit or-
ganizations are inferior to foreign rivals, especially European and Japanese ‘universal banks’ which 
were not subject to such limitations (Grinspen 2009: 200). 
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1. Subjects of international law (and their economic agents) largely behave 
the same way as subjects of national law and the market previously did. As they 
use foreign currency and foreign currency rates in their dealings, this invariably 
leads to sharp distortions in international trade, devaluations, etc. 
2. In the last decades capital movement between countries became free, that 
is it is relatively weakly regulated by national law and almost not regulated at 
all by international law. This causes huge and exceedingly fast capital move-
ments, which lead to a very rapid growth in some places and then to a sharp 
decline and corresponding crisis phenomena.  
3. In the modern economy not only new financial technologies have been 
developed, but the modern economy itself largely started producing values 
namely in the financial sphere (financial services). Thus, the financial compo-
nent of crisis has increased dramatically; this differs from previous decades, 
when the main growth went on in the sphere of manufacturing. These processes 
are analyzed in greater detail in the following publications: Grinin 2009a, 
2009b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012; Grinin, Malkov, and Korotayev 2009. 
We would like to conclude the present section with the following important 
note. Activities of modern financial corporations and funds lead to an uncon-
trollable growth of financial assets and anarchy in their movements; that is why 
it is criticized quite convincingly by various authors (e.g., Schäfer 2009: 279–
280), including ourselves (Grinin 2009а, 2009c, 2009d, 2012; Grinin and Koro-
tayev 2010a, 2010b; Grinin, Malkov, and Korotayev 2010; Grinin, Korotayev, 
and Malkov 2010; Akaev, Fomin, Tsirel, and Korotayev 2010; Akaev, Sa-
dovnichy, and Korotayev 2011, 2012). That is why we are absolutely con-
vinced of the necessity to look for ways to minimize the respective risks at the 
global scale, to regulate activities of financial actors, and to restrict them in 
their most risky operations (Ibid.). However, it is highly erroneous to claim that 
the modern financial technologies are immanently destructive, that they only lead 
the world economy to various calamities, that they are only useful to parasitic 
financers and speculators. Contrary to this, the modern financial sector performs 
a lot of generally useful important functions at the global scale. Our own analy-
sis has demonstrated quite convincingly that the global financial system, not-
withstanding all its negative points, still performs certain important positive 
functions including the ‘insurance’ of social guaranties on a global scale (Grin-
in 2009d, 2010b, 2012; Grinin and Korotayev 2010a).  
Correlation between K-Waves and J-Cycles  
1. Preliminary Discussion  
Introductory Notes  
The main goal of this section is to study the interaction between K-waves and 
J-cycles. We believe that the analysis of this interaction may help to clarify 
significantly both the causes of the alternation of upswing and downswing 
phases in the K-waves and the relative stability of their characteristic period.  
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We have already noticed above that there are numerous explanations as re-
gards the origins of the medium-term Juglar cycles with their characteristic 
period between 7 and 11 years;20 however, there is a substantial degree of una-
nimity as regards the main factors that are responsible for the emergence of the 
Juglar fluctuations (though this unanimity is absent as regards the contribution 
of each of those factors). There is much less clarity and unanimity as regards 
the causes of the emergence and recurrence of the K-waves (long cycles), as 
this field is still mostly dominated by various hypotheses (see, e.g., Korotayev 
and Grinin 2012a).21 
Notwithstanding substantial advances in the study of wave-like periodic fluc-
tuations, there is no unanimity among researchers as regards many important 
points (see, e.g., Goldstein 1988 for a review of earlier literature on this subject, 
or Korotayev and Grinin 2012a); those points include the total number of attested  
Kondratieff cycles; their periodization (this includes the issue of the pres-
ence/absence of the K-waves before the industrial revolution of the 18th century);22 
which parameters should be used to trace periodic fluctuations; which spheres are 
subject to those fluctuations (whether they are observed in the economic subsys-
tem only, or also in political and cultural spheres).23 There is no unanimity either 
as regards the issue of the main factors affecting the formation of the waves and 
the change of their phases24 (for more details see Grinin, Devezas, and Korotayev 
2012).  
Notwithstanding the abovementioned difficulties, we may base our further 
research on the fact that the K-wave dynamics was actually observed at least 
during the last two centuries; that we do observe some fairly periodic fluctua-
tions of some important economic indicators (technological innovations, prices, 
GDP, trade turnover, etc. (see, e.g., Korotayev and Tsirel 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; 
                                                          
20 See, e.g., Juglar 1862, 1889; Lescure 1908; Marx 1961 [1893, 1894]; Tugan-Baranovsky 1954, 
2008 [1913]; Hilferding 1922; Mitchell 1930; Keynes 1978 [1936]; Varga 1937; Trakhtenberg 
1963; Haberler 1964 [1937], 2008; Mendelson 1959–1964; Minsky 1983, 1985, 1986, 2005; 
Hicks 1993: 432–442; Samuelson and Nordhaus 2009a; Samuelson 1994; Schumpeter 1939, 
1982; von Hayek 1931, 1933; von Mises 1981 [1912], 2005; Cassel 1925; Pigou 1929; Fridman 
2002; Abel and Bernanke 2008a: 361–502. 
21 Some of those hypotheses even suggest climatic change as the main factor generating the  
K-waves (see, e.g., Mougy 1992). 
22 For the evidence supporting the existence of the preindustrial K-waves see, e.g., Goldstein 1988; 
Modelski 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Modelski and Thompson 1992, 1996; Modelski, Thompson, 
and Devezas 2008; Mougy 1992; Pantin 1996; Pantin and Lapkin 2006, etc. Some scholars, while 
not rejecting some long-term fluctuations in the pre-industrial period, consider the K-waves in 
this period as certain historical excesses produced by various exogenous factors (see, e.g., Maev-
sky 1992: 60).  
23 See an incomplete list of such problems in the following publications: Maevsky 1992: 58–60; 
Avramov 1992: 64–66; Rumyantseva 2003: 11–12.  
24 As regards the underlying causes, one can identify mono-causal and multi-causal approaches;  
the latter with more or less success can be combined into one or another paradigm synthesis. 
About the criticism of mono-causal approaches see, e.g., Rumyantseva 2003: 50.  
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Korotayev, Zinkina, and Bogevolnov 2011; Berry and Dean 2012; Devezas 2012; 
Helenius 2012; Husson and Louca 2012; Korotayev and Grinin 2012a; Modelski 
2012; Ternyik 2012; Thompson 2012; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011). 
We believe that one of the most promising directions of the K-wave re-
search is constituted by the analysis of the connections between the K-wave 
and J-cycle dynamics. It appears a bit strange that the relations between  
K-waves and J-cycles have not been studied sufficiently yet, which indicates 
that the importance of this relationship is still underestimated.25 
The relationship between K-waves and J-cycles is visible rather saliently in 
the point that the most widely accepted dates of the Kondratieff waves and their 
phases are tightly connected with the most widely accepted dates of Juglar cy-
cles. However, even this aspect of the relationship between Kondratieff and 
Juglar cycles has been studied rather superfluously and insufficiently (see 
Poletaev and Saveljeva 1993: 11–12; Avramov 1992: 66–68); note that Kon-
dratieff himself did not pay much attention to this relationship (Kondratieff 
2002: 379–380). Schumpeter (1939) paid significantly more attention to this 
relationship; however, we believe that his view of this relationship was too 
straightforward; he thought that the structure of long cycles (K-waves) was too 
similar to the structure of medium-term J-cycles (see also Rumyantseva 2003: 
19). Note that Schumpeter, when developing his theory of cycles with different 
characteristic periods, based himself on the principle of the unity of the cause and 
the multiplicity of the effects (Avramov 1992: 67); this does not appear to be 
correct despite some heuristic value of the respective principle. Long-term pro-
cesses are likely to be caused by factors that are different from the ones causing 
short-term processes (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a: 105–
111). Below we will demonstrate that the factors generating K-waves are inherent 
within the expanding reproduction of the economy; however, the shorter-term 
impulses generating J-cycles produce some ordering of the K-waves.  
We believe we need a more profound study of the relationship between two 
types of cycles. We think that the study of the interaction between J-cycles and 
K-waves is capable of shedding light on the reasons of the relative stability of the 
characteristic period of the K-waves and their phases. It does not appear to be 
possible to explain completely this periodicity with exogenous factors – such as 
the alteration of technological or population generations. It appears necessary to 
look for such economic and social processes that are capable to support the 
abovementioned rhythm. From our point of view, the only real factor that is able 
to give to the Kondratieff waves the respective rhythm is represented by the Ju-
glar cycles. In addition to the study of the organic links between K-waves and  
                                                          
25 The concept of long waves and the ‘normal’ business cycle theory exist and develop relatively 
independently. Experts on the theory of the business cycle with minimal exceptions try to ignore 
the existence of long waves, and K-wave students make little use of the ‘conventional’ business 
cycle theory (Poletaev and Saveljeva 1993: 11–12).  
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J-cycles, it appears absolutely necessary to research the links between those two 
types of cycles and certain world-system processes.  
Some Preliminary Conclusions  
The analysis of the K-wave manifestation and alteration demonstrates quite 
convincingly that, notwithstanding a considerable variety of explanations of K-
waves, proponents of all the respective theories are partly right. However, each 
of those theories has a rather limited field of application. Thus, in order to 
achieve a more adequate understanding of the nature of the K-waves and their 
driving forces we need a profound synthesis of various theories.26 The situation 
here is somehow analogous to the one attested in the theory of medium-range 
cycles. Essentially, proponents of most approaches are right, but the general 
understanding may only be worked out through a synthetic theory (see, e.g., 
Haberler 1964 [1937], 2008). Note, by the way, that more theories have been 
proposed to account for the J-cycles than for K-waves (in particular psycholog-
ical factors are hardly taken into account in the latter case [for more details on 
those factors see, e.g., Haberler 1964 [1937], 2008; Grinin 2009d; Grinin, Ko-
rotayev, and Malkov 2010], though such factors are very important for an ade-
quate understanding of the alteration of phases of the K-waves). 
We have based ourselves on the following approaches to the study of en-
dogenous factors: innovation-based and investment-based, as well as on those 
approaches that pay most attention to such factors as capital depreciation, de-
cline of profit rates, and the alteration of technological paradigms. We have 
also taken into account such approaches that pay special attention to exogenous 
factors: influence of the warfare and the expansion of the external resource 
base, as well as monetary theories. However, those theories are only used by us 
within certain limits, determined by our general approaches. It also appears 
necessary to take into account the point that we only consider K-waves in their 
economic dimension, ignoring civilization, cultural and other manifestations of 
the K-waves, but taking into account the full spectrum of factors of the K-wave 
dynamics (including political, legal, and social factors).  
It appears necessary to emphasize again that a very important component 
of our theory that allows to integrate various approaches is the reliance on the 
organic link between K-waves and J-cycles.  
Below we will present our answers to a few questions that are important 
with the analysis of K-waves. 
1) Are there endogenous factors that generate the alteration of up-
swings and downswings? 
The very alteration of downswings and upswings is connected with the 
need of the industrial economy to expand; this expansion, however, inevitably 
                                                          
26 Such a task is mentioned from time to time by the K-wave students (see, e.g., Menshikov and 
Klimenko 1989; Lazurenko 1992). 
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meets serious obstacles. One may speak about the alteration of two develop-
mental trends: 1) prevalence of qualitative innovations (creation of new tech-
nologies); 2) prevalence of quantitative development – implying a wide intro-
duction/diffusion of innovations (see, e.g., Korotayev, Zinkina, and Boge-
volnov 2011). Both tendencies are simultaneously present in economic sys-
tems; however, in some periods one of these tendencies prevails, whereas in the 
other periods the other tendency does (see, e.g., Perez 2002, 2010, 2011a, 
2011b, 2012; Grinin 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 
2009b, 2012, 2013; Korotayev 2005, 2006, 2007; Korotayev and Grinin 2012a, 
2012b; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a, 2006b; Grinin and Korota-
yev 2012). Processes of qualitative innovation are connected with periods of 
emergence and validation of new technologies of various types (production 
technologies, financial technologies, social technologies – including technolo-
gies of counter-crisis management). Quantitative processes are connected with 
such periods when such technologies diffuse widely – up to the exhaustion of 
their potential. For those countries that follow the leaders of the World System, 
processes of wide diffusion of technologies are virtually equivalent to the pro-
cess of catch-up modernization (Grinin and Korotayev 2010a, 2010b; Grinin 
2013a). At the level of the World System, the analysis of processes of such a 
modernization (as we will see) may play an important role in the explanation of 
the length of particular A-phases. 
The periods of predominantly qualitative development determine a poten-
tial possibility of the B-phase realization, whereas periods of predominantly 
quantitative development determine a potential possibility of the A-phase reali-
zation. Qualitative changes (having shown their advantages) tend to ex-
pand/diffuse. After new technologies become habitual, after they come to the 
level of saturation, they lose their stimulating meaning (see, e.g., Perez 2002, 
2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; see also Akaev and Rumyantseva et al. 2011); for a 
new acceleration the global economic system needs a transition from extensive 
(quantitative) development to a new period of innovative qualitative develop-
ment. As is well known, this leads not only to the changes of technological par-
adigms, but also to the changes of financial styles, relationships in the frame-
work of the world trade and so on (see, e.g., Kondratieff 2002; Schumpeter 
1939; Menshikov and Klimenko 1989; Lazurenko 1992; Pantin and Lapkin 
2006; Rumyantseva 2003; Grinin 2010а; Grinin and Korotayev 2010b; Korota-
yev, Zinkina, and Bogevolnov 2011).  
Thus, prolonged processes of the generation and diffusion of innovation, 
change of technological paradigms, as well as the models of international rela-
tions and economic regulation give long-term impulses toward the acceleration 
or deceleration of the growth of production, sales, prices, and so on. However, 
the scheme described above implies only the possibility of alteration of up-
swings and downswings, but it does not imply that such alteration should be 
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regular/periodic. The mechanism that generates a relatively regular periodic 
temporal rhythm of the phase alteration is established through the alteration  
J-cycle clusters (see below). Thus, the dynamics of Kondratieff waves is gener-
ated by a complex set of various factors and causes that acquire a certain direc-
tionality through a synthesis of long-term impulses, J-cycle rhythm, as well as 
various reactions of economic actors. That is why we cannot agree with Sergey 
Glaziev who believes that the basis of the K-wave dynamics is created by the 
life cycles of technological paradigms, whereas ‘at the surface of economic 
phenomena these look as long cycles of economic conjuncture’ (Glaziev 2009: 
26). This looks as an approach in spirit of Hegel – Marx' set of ‘essence and its 
epiphenomena’ that not only strips K-waves of their specificity – it reduces 
them to one factor only while ignoring a number of such factors that are of no 
less importance. 
As far as exogenous factors (e.g., wars) are concerned, they amplify certain 
(e.g., inflationary) impulses (that may trigger the process of change). However, 
it is important to understand that at the level of the World System it does not 
really make sense to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous factors 
(except, of course, certain natural [from seismic to cosmic27] ones). In full ex-
tent both K-waves and J-cycles are traced at the World System level. We can 
hardly find any single society where those waves and cycles are perfectly 
traced throughout all the 200 years of the industrial development. And if we 
analyze K-waves at the World System level, then we have to interpret all the 
relevant social and economic processes as endogenous. In other words, at the 
World System level we should rather speak about endogenous factors of vari-
ous orders (except, as has been already mentioned, some natural factors).  
2) Which factors do determine a relative temporal stability of the 
length of K-waves and their A- and B-phases? 
The K-waves' length and relative regularity of the alteration of their phases is 
determined by J-cycle clusters. A-cluster may consist of two to four upswing J-
cycles (though most frequently their number is three); B-cluster may consist of 
two or three downswing J-cycles (though most frequently their number is two). 
During the K-wave A-phase the fast economic expansion leads inevitably to the 
necessity of societal change; as a result, B-phase starts. But the possibilities of 
societal transformation lag behind the demands of the economy, that is why the 
periods of such a restructuring correspond to periods of more difficult devel-
opment, that is, to K-wave downswings. Below we will discuss this point in 
more detail. It makes sense to pay attention to the point that cyclical crises are 
attributes of medium term crises only.  
 
 
                                                          
27E.g., solar activity.  
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Fig. 2. Clusters of Juglar Cycles  
3) Why and how do the main characteristics of the K-wave dynamics 
change?  
This is a result of the development of the world economy, the transition to 
new conditions, resulting from the transformation of the World System. In the 
metallic standard epoch, prices were the best K-wave indicators (they are visi-
ble there till now when the prices of key commodities expressed in grams of 
gold [e.g., Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011]); later they became more visible 
in some indicators of economic growth.  
4) Which endogenous mechanisms account for the alteration of long-
term trends of inflation/deflation? 
Those trends are embedded in the nature of industrial economy itself 
(whereas wars, discoveries of new rich deposits of precious metals and other 
exogenous factors of this sort may amplify additionally inflationary trends). 
The trends toward expansion and growth tend to lead to increasing resource 
limitations and – hence – inflation. However, with metal money, the growth 
rates of the productivity of labor and potential to produce goods start to outstrip 
the growth rates of the money mass (effective demand). Money becomes more 
expensive and profits tend to decrease. This leads to the search for new ways to 
increase the production, and one of such ways is to reduce costs. The latter 
leads to the further growth of the volume of the produced goods against the 
background of the reduction of their prices. Thus, the tendency toward econom-
ic expansion generates both the inflationary and deflationary trends. Busi-
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nessmen look actively for the opportunities to increase profit rates and to fight 
deflation. Such opportunities are usually found (though in no way automatical-
ly) through the market expansion (export) and/or the creation/diffusion of new 
financial technologies. To counteract the deflation effectively a rather wide 
diffusion of financial technologies is necessary. This increases the monetary 
mass and – consequently – the effective demand (at the level of both individual 
societies and the World System as a whole). However, with the exhaustion of 
the potential of new technologies and territories the deflationary trend strength-
ens again.  
5) Is it possible to speak about the decrease of the characteristic peri-
od of the K-waves? And, if yes, what is the mechanism of this decrease? 
As has been mentioned above, in the 19th and 20th centuries the characteris-
tic period of the J-cycles decreased from 11 to 7–9 years. This was accompa-
nied by the decrease of the characteristic period of the K-waves from 60 to 45–
50 years. Thus, some shortening of the K-wave period appears to be observed. 
However, this change of the length of the K-waves is rather complex (some 
explanations for this phenomenon will be suggested below). 
There are some quite grounded hypotheses regarding a significant shorten-
ing of the periods of the 4th and 5th K-waves in comparison with those K-waves 
that preceded the World War II, suggesting that the lengths of phases and 
waves depend generally on the speed of reaction of social systems. In the 
1970s –1980s in the USA and Europe (especially in the UK) some new radical 
decisions were made that helped to move faster respective societies from the 
downswing trough. It appears important to note that in some respects those de-
cisions contributed to the emergence and development of new technologies 
(and – in particular – financial technologies).  
It is important to note that states and other actors spend enormous efforts in 
order to prolong the prosperous period and to shorten the depressive period. 
Against this background it is hardly surprising that this is precisely the B-phase 
(and not the A-phase) of which the length is shortening. We believe that this is 
a much simpler and more adequate explanation for the shortening of the  
B-phase of the 4th K-wave in comparison with the explanation proposed by 
Pantin and Lapkin (2006: 289–303).28 
                                                          
28 The gist of their approach is that there are two different types of upward and downward phases of 
long waves and long waves themselves constitute half of a longer cycle, which consists of two 
Kondratieff waves and leads to a radical change in technological and institutional foundations of 
the economy and the international division of labor. According to Pantin and Lapkin, duration  
of the downswing phase of long waves with the transition from one complete evolutionary cycle 
to another is reduced by an average of 12 years, while the duration of the upswing phase of Kon-
dratieff waves is kept roughly constant (about 24 years). The very same shortening of evolution-
ary cycles of world development is due, in their opinion, to the general acceleration of social de-
velopment. Indeed, one would expect that the acceleration of the rate of development will reduce 
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6) Is there any relationship between K-waves and warfare? 
Before the World War I a certain background of wars was observed during 
both K-wave phases. However, during A-phases warfare frequency somehow 
increased due to the intensification of World System modernization processes. 
The point is that the accelerating modernization generates strains within states 
and between them, which tends to lead to the increase in warfare frequency. 
Explanation of the characteristic periodicity of the J-cycle. Thus, the 
temporal rhythm of change of K-wave phases is connected with the characteris-
tic period of the J-cycle. But what determines the length of the J-cycle itself? 
There are no clear explanations for the period of the Juglar cycle being be-
tween 7 and 11 years. We suggest that the minimum and maximum length of 
the J-cycle stems from rather natural circumstances. If we take a cycle consist-
ing of four phases, even with an average length of each phase around a year, the 
period of the cycle will be about four years (however, it should be taken into 
account that each phase consists of at least two sub-phases). Of course, within 
K-wave A-phases the phases of repression, depression, and recovery may last 
one year each (whereas the recession may last even less than one year), 
though depression and recovery phases may last for two and even more years 
each. On the other hand, the upswing phase of the J-cycle can hardly last for 
just one year, as a one year long upswing can hardly generate the overheating 
of the economy.  
In order for a downswing to transform into a boom a fast growth should 
continue for at least three years. The first two years of expansion tend to go on 
the basis of the engaging of existing capacities as well as the realization of the 
changes made during the recession and depression. Two years of expansion 
make businessmen confident that the situation is permanently improving. They 
begin to invest more actively, the credit expands, the prices of resources start 
growing. However, in order that the development could reach a limit, beyond 
which an easy economic growth becomes impossible, a rather significant in-
crease in GDP should be observed,29 which needs normally not less than 
four years even with rather fast growth rates. This time is necessary for the 
‘bubbles’ to form, prices reach record levels and the credit expansion experi-
ences the overloading. In any case, four to five years of expansion (+ three–
four years for the other phases) yield together at least seven–nine years. 
However, in favorable conditions the expansion may continue even seven or 
eight years. The empirical data on the J-cycle length are discussed further in 
this article. 
                                                                                                                                
the duration of Kondratieff waves, but the logic of these authors is not clear – why does the 
length of some phases decline? And why do the others remain stable (whereas the shortening 
should rather be manifested proportionally)?  
29 No less than 30–50 %, whereas in emergent markets the growth may be twofold, or even three-
fold.  
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2. Juglar Cycles as Structural Elements of the K-Waves 
How many J-Cycles do We Find during a K-Wave Phase?  
An Analysis of Empirical Data  
‘Economists use widely modeling on the basis of so-called stylized facts. 
This is achieved through the simplification of the real situation by ab-
stracting from concrete historical fluctuations, which allows to identify 
the most significant features in the economic dynamics. Such stylized 
facts include the statement that the large cycle consists of six medium-
range Juglar cycles. Duration of the industrial cycle of this type almost 
always (this is also a stylized fact) falls within the range of 7 to 11 years. 
Accordingly, the total duration of the big cycle can range from 42 to 
66 years, which is roughly consistent with observations from the begin-
ning of the industrial revolution in the UK, as well as with the assertion 
that the average length of a long wave is half a century. It is also argued 
that a long cycle consists of approximately equal halves: the rising and 
falling waves of economic conditions. Thus, every half contains three 
Juglar cycles’ (Klinov 2008: 64). 
In our verbal model of the relationship between K-waves and J-cycles (as in our 
spectral analysis [Korotayev and Tsirel 2010a; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011: 
Ch. 2] and our mathematical model of the J-cycle [Grinin, Malkov, and Korotayev 
2010]) we were bound to use stylized facts mentioned by Vilenin Klinov. Now 
we will try to find out how much those stylized facts correspond to the empirical 
data. We will pay a special attention to the following ‘stylized facts’: a) each K-
wave consists of six J-cycles; b) the length of the A-phase of each K-wave is 
equal to the length of its B-phase; c) each A-phase consists of three J-cycles, and 
each B-phase also consists of three J-cycles. 
First, consider the general picture of the correlation between Juglar cycles 
and Kondratieff waves (see Table 1 and Fig. 3).  
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Table 1. Correlation between Juglar cycles and Kondratieff waves  
(the first version)  
Serial 
numbers 
of K-
waves 
Long waves' phases and  
their dates  
Serial numbers and 
dates of J-cycles 
Number of J-
cycles per 
the respec-
tive K-wave 
phase 
I B (downswing):  
1817–1847  
J1: 1817–1825 3 
J2: 1825–1836/7 
J3: 1836/7–1847 
II A (upswing):  
1847–1873 
J4: 1847–1857 3 
J5: 1857–1866  
J6: 1866–1873  
B (downswing):  
1873–1890/3 
J7: 1873–1882  2 
J8: 1882–1890/3  
III A(upswing):  
1890–1929/33 
J9: 1890/3–1900/3  4 
J10: 1900/3–1907 
J11: 1907–1920 
J12: 1920–1929/33 
B(downswing):  
1929/33–1948/9 
J13: 1929/33–1937/8 2 
J14: 1937/8–1948/9 
IV A(upswing):  
1948/9–1966/7 
J15: 1948/9–1957/8  230 
J16: 1957/8–1966/7 
B(downswing):  
1966/7–1979/82  
J17: 1966/7–1974/5 2 
J18: 1974/5–1979/82 
V A(upswing):  
1979/82–2008/10 
J19: 1979/82–1990/3 3 
J20: 1990/3–2001/2 
J21: 2001/2–2008/10 
                                                          
30 However, it is possible to single out in this phase three shorter (rather than two longer) J-cycles: 
1947–1954; 1954–1961 (whose course was somehow interrupted by the 1957 crisis); 1962–1967. 
The general length of the phase – 20 years – allows to speak about three short J-cycles. Such a 
vague cyclical dynamics was produced by an active Keynesian interference in the cycles, as well 
as by the difference in the course of the cycles in Europe and the USA (for more details see Grin-
in and Korotayev 2010b).  
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Fig. 3. Correlation between Juglar cycles and Kondratieff waves  
(the first version)  
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Fig. 4. Length of K-wave A- and B-phases (the first version) 
At this point it appears reasonable to return to the consideration of the general 
dynamics of the annual world GDP growth rates in 1945–2007 (see Fig. 5):  
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Fig. 5. Dynamics of the annual world GDP growth rates (%), 1945–2007   
Sources: World Bank 2014; Maddison 2010. 
This diagram indicates rather clearly an ambiguous position of the 19th J-cycle 
(1979/1982–1990/3). Following a number of K-wave scholars, we included the 
19th J-cycle above into the 5th K-wave A-phase. However, due to the patently 
transitional character of this cycle, we do not see sufficient grounds to exclude 
the possibility of its inclusion into the K-wave B-phase. In addition, the dia-
gram suggests that the 1967–1974 period (the 18th J-cycle) can be considered to 
be a part of both A-phase and B-phase of the 4th K-wave. In this case, we get a 
different picture of the correlation between K-waves and J-cycles (see Table 2 
and Figs. 6–7). 
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Table 2. Correlation between Juglar cycles and Kondratieff waves  
(the second version)  
Serial 
numbers 
of K-
waves 
Long waves' phases and  
their dates  
Serial numbers and 
dates of J-cycles 
Number of J-
cycles per the 
respective K-
wave phase 
I 
B (downswing):  
1817–1847  
J1: 1817–1825 
3 J2: 1825–1836/7 
J3: 1836/7–1847 
II 
A (upswing):  
1847–1873 
J4: 1847–1857 
3 J5: 1857–1866  
J6: 1866–1873  
 B (downswing):  1873–1890/3 
J7: 1873–1882  2 J8: 1882–1890/3  
III 
A(upswing):  
1890–1929/33 
J9: 1890/3–1900/3  
4 J10: 1900/3–1907 J11: 1907–1920 
J12: 1920–1929/33 
B(downswing):  
1929/33–1948/9 
J13: 1929/33–1937/8 2 J14: 1937/8–1948/9 
IV 
A(upswing):  
1948/9–1966/7 
J15: 1948/9–1957/8  
3 (or 431) J16: 1957/8–1966/7 
J17: 1966/7–1974/5 
B(downswing):  
1974/5–1990/3 
J18: 1974/5–1979/82 2 J19: 1979/82–1990/3 
V A(upswing):  1990/3–2008/10 
J20: 1990/3–2001/2 2 J21: 2001/2–2008/10 
 
                                                          
31 See the note to the first version of this table.  
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Fig. 6. Correlation between Juglar cycles and Kondratieff waves  
(the second version)  
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Fig. 7. Length of А- and В-phases of К-cycles (second version)  
We believe that our analysis allows us to make the following preliminary 
conclusions.  
1) First of all, we see that the actual lengths of K-waves, as well as their  
A- and B-phases do not correspond fully to the ‘stylized facts’; in addition, 
there are significant variations both in the absolute lengths, and the number of 
J-cycles that fit into them. In the framework of the first version the same num-
ber of J-cycles in the A-phase and B-phase within a K-wave is observed in only 
one case out of three, and in two cases the number of J-cycles in the A-phase 
exceeds the number of J-cycles in the B-phase. Within the second version the 
number of A-phase J-cycles exceeds the number of B-phase cycles in all  
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the three cases. At the same time, taking into account what has been said in the 
note to Table 1 the number of A-phase J-cycles may exceed the number of B-
phase cycles in all three cases in the first version too. Based on these conclu-
sions, we graphically represent two versions of the relationship between the J-
cycles and K-waves in Figs. 10 and 11 at the end of this article: one with equal 
numbers of J-cycles in the A- and B-phases (Fig. 10), whereas in Fig. 11 this 
number is unequal (three A-phase J-cycles versus two B-phase J-cycles).  
2) Note that we observe in both cases the tendency that we have already 
discussed above, namely the tendency toward the reduction of the absolute du-
ration of B-phases. In this article we suggest a possible explanation for this 
phenomenon. With respect to the A-phase this reduction does not appear to be 
observed in a comparably clear way (and we will suggest our explanation for 
this phenomenon too). Thus, as we shall see below, due to deliberate action of 
economic actors upon the Juglar dynamics the duration of A-phase tends to be 
longer than the one of the B-cycles (irrespective of how we count this dura-
tion – in years, or in Juglars). 
In general, for both versions of the four A-phases we find 12 J-cycles, 
whereas for four B-phases we find only 9 J-cycles.  
3) Much has been written about the absolute duration of K-waves meas-
ured in years (see above), so we will not dwell on this issue here. But if we use 
‘Juglar’ as a unit of measurement of the length of K-waves, we must note that 
this length fluctuates between 4 and 6 ‘Juglars’. On average, if 21 ‘Juglars’ are 
divided into four waves (three full waves and two ‘halves’), then one has on 
average 5.25 ‘Juglars’ per one K-wave (note that with the second version of the 
estimate of the duration of the 4th K-wave A-phase, we will get on average 5.5 
‘Juglars’ per one K-wave).  
However – and this is crucial for the theory presented in this article – 
whatever the duration of the phases, we see in any case an integral number of  
J-cycles in any K-wave. This shows that the deep and tangible connection be-
tween J-cycles and K-waves is observed on the ‘essential’ rather than phenom-
enological level.  
4) Thus, the idea of measuring the duration of the K-phase waves not only 
in years, but also in ‘Juglars’ has a very specific meaning, as the number of 
‘Juglars’ in different waves and phases respectively ranges from 4 to 6 and 
from 2 to 4 (see, e.g., Figs. 6 and 7 above). In this case, the ‘economic time 
begins to be measured not in years, but in cycles’ (Avramov 1992: 64). 
Thus, depending on the chosen periodization, the number of ‘Juglars’ in 
the same K-wave and the same phase of the wave varies. For example, accord-
ing to Version 1, the fourth K-wave includes 4 ‘Juglars’; according to Version 
2 it consists of 5 ‘Juglars’. Accordingly, the A-phase of the 5th K-wave includes 
either three or two ‘Juglars’. And the latter is very essential for the develop-
ment of economic forecasts, as we shall see below.  
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When you add an electron to an atom (or take an electron from it), this at-
om undergoes a substantial change (it becomes a positively or negatively 
charged ion instead of the neutral atom). In a similar way, the exten-
sion/contraction of A- or B-phases by one Juglar leads to the significant chang-
es in the economy and economic moods, the tone of economic theories, as well 
as to the intensification in search of anti-crisis measures. 
5) Kondratieff's conclusion that ‘during the rise of the long waves, years of 
prosperity are more numerous, whereas years of depression predominate during 
the downswing’ (1935: 111) may be augmented with the conclusion that, gen-
erally, at the K-wave B-phases J-cycles are longer than at the A-phases. In par-
ticular, the calculation shows that at the A-phase the average duration of one  
J-cycle is about 9–9,1 years (and if we add an additional cycle to the A-phase 
of the 4th K-wave, this duration will be equal to about 8.3 years), while the av-
erage duration of one J-cycle at the B-phase is about 10,2–10,3 years. We at-
tribute this to the following circumstances: a) within B-cluster J-cycles we ob-
serve the lengthening of phases of recession and depression in comparison with 
A-clusters, and b) in the A-cluster J-cycles one observes so powerful phases of 
expansions, that sub-phases of overheating, acute crisis and recession phase 
occur very fast, within a rather short period of time. 
6) The forecast may change substantially depending on what version of the 
periodization of the 5th K-wave will be chosen. For example, in Chapter 2 of our 
previous monograph (Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011) we offered two ver-
sions of forecasting the dynamics for the forthcoming two decades. Note that in 
both cases we base ourselves on the assumption that the A-phase of the 5th  
K-wave must be longer that its B-phase. In any case, the A-phase of the 5th K-
wave corresponds to three J-cycles, whereas its B-phase is most likely to consist of 
two ‘Juglars’.  
We find the first version to be more probable; it suggests that the A-phase 
of the 5th K-wave ended with the start of the global crisis in 2008, when the  
B-phase started. In this case – taking into account the active search throughout 
the World System for effective anti-crisis measures – the duration of the  
B-phase should not be more than two ‘Juglars’, and it is very likely that the 
duration of J-cycles within the cluster should not be very long. We should also 
take into account the tendency for the duration of B-phases to decrease. But at 
the same time B-phase shall not be less than two ‘Juglars’, whereas, as we have 
seen, short J-cycles are less typical for B-phases than for A-phases. Therefore, 
we can suggest a tentative forecast that the present B-phase of the 5th K-wave 
will have a duration of 14 to 18 years.  
7) The presence of more than one version of periodization and forecasts 
should not be of any surprise – taking into account the extreme narrowness of 
the empirical basis. Indeed, one can talk reliably about Juglar cycles only start-
ing from the first clear Juglar cycle of 1817–1825. Therefore, to date, we can 
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only talk about three full K-waves and two ‘halves’, in which the interaction 
between Juglar and Kondratieff dynamics has been clearly observed, which 
does not meet the minimum requirements for regular analysis of cyclic process-
es (Avramov 1992: 72; Grinin and Korotayev 2013). In his paper published in 
1992, Avramov maintained that within the relative chronology of the theories 
of his day, the stage of development of the long-wave theory could be com-
pared with the situation in the medium-term cycles theory in the 1870s (Ibid.). 
With the passage of time, the theory of K-waves approached a level of devel-
opment of the theory of medium-term cycles at the time of the first edition of 
Tugan-Baranovsky's classical volume in 1894; however, Tugan-Baranovsky 
himself then said about the theory of medium-term cycles that it was ‘the least 
studied subject in the economic literature’ (Tugan-Baranovsky 1894: 377). 
3. Verbal Model of K-Waves 
General Outline  
The main ‘intrigue’ of the K-wave phenomenon is a relatively regular period of 
the change from K-wave upswings to K-wave downswings, and vice versa. Our 
general ideas that allow to understand better the mechanism of changing trends, 
can be presented as follows:  
1) Both trends (upward and downward ) are present in the modern econo-
my at the same time and always (so periods when there is no qualitative or 
quantitative development at all, are extremely rare, just one hardly find cases  
of overall growth without any stagnant sectors at all); but at every phase one or 
those trends predominates.  
2) The change of the trend is largely prepared by its exhaustion, i.e. the 
weakening of one trend paves the way for the strengthening of the other. 
3) In other words, one can observe an evident negative feedback between 
the trends, which strengthens with each new medium-term cycle (until the trend 
does not change), since the nature and results of each J-cycle is a signal for a 
particular type of action of active participants in the process (from individual 
entrepreneurs to whole states and supranational organizations). Rising prices 
and profit margins, as well as high demand cumulatively lead to the expansion 
of production. The falling rate of profit, reduction of the growth rates, etc. lead 
to the reduction in investment and the search for new innovative solutions.  
4) The nature of the trend depends largely on the type of action chosen by 
the majority of participants in the process.  
5) The relatively regular characteristic period of the K-wave phase altera-
tion is determined by the relative stable characteristic period of the J-cycles (7–
11 years), whereas J-cycle clusters (that mostly include three J-cycles each) 
tend to last somewhere in the range between 20 and 30 years. We would also 
add that, in relation to the theory of generations, 10 years is not a period that is 
long enough to significantly alter the generation of businessmen (and especially 
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politicians) so that to more proactive and less cautious entrepreneurs could ap-
pear. Two or three J-cycles (7–11 years each) are just sufficient to renew 
the generation of businessmen.  
6) The only exception is constituted by the upswing (A-) phase of the First 
K-wave (the late 1780s – the early 1790s – 1810–1817), as it was generated 
mostly by external [military] factors (see for more details below). However, 
the B-phase of the First K-wave started with the first J-cycle (approximately 
1815/1818–1825) that ended the first large-scale cyclical crisis in 1825.  
Thus, the alteration of upswings and downswings is inherent in the proper-
ties of the industrial and post-industrial economy that seeks to expand, but is 
impeded by all sorts of obstacles, and the rather regular duration of K-wave 
upswing and downswing phases is connected with the time frames of the  
J-cycle length. 
Notes on Dynamics  
As we have already mentioned above, in the modern economic systems the 
periods of predominantly qualitative (innovative) development are followed by 
periods of mainly quantitative development and vice versa. However, it is im-
portant to note that such a development occurs with sufficient frequency not 
within a single country, but only in the framework of the World System as 
a whole (but in some periods, it can also be observed in the core states of the 
World System). In addition, each of these pulsations is associated with the ex-
pansion of the World System and the change of its configuration. This leads to 
a change in the economic and political relations within the boundaries of  
the World System. The mechanism of a rather fast impulse propagation in the 
framework of the World System and relatively synchronous change of devel-
opment vectors are associated with the increasingly close interaction of econo-
mies and societies through a variety of financial and other links.  
Secondly, by itself the alteration of innovation and modernization trends 
may not have sufficiently clear time limits. Modernization trends within the 
World System cannot arise from the investments and implementation of major 
innovations in different countries because the timing and modalities of these 
processes are very different, and investments themselves cannot be synchro-
nized. To repeat: the timing and the relative accuracy of the K-wave phase 
alteration are determined by the nature of the J-cycle clusters. During the 
K-wave upswing one can observe a rapid expansion, which inevitably requires 
significant changes from society.32 However, such changes are far behind in time 
from the objective need in them (due to the time required for the emergence of 
awareness of the problem, its discussion, the search and decision-making, imple-
mentation of solutions in practice, etc.). Such a delay is one of the important rea-
sons why we can frequently observe a period of more difficult (‘downswing’) 
                                                          
32 This was noticed already by Simon Kuznets (1966). 
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development (B-cluster of J-cycles) after the upward phase.) During the struggle 
with the crisis-depressive phenomena economic actors are searching for ways to 
overcome difficulties. As a result, in some societies a social innovation emerges, 
which then begins to be applied not only in this society but also in many others. 
Then new upward momentum in some societies creates conditions for transition 
to a new A-phase upswing. But the wide (i.e. in many societies) awareness of the 
benefits of such a social innovation does not happen immediately, but around 
the second J-cycle of a new A-phase.  
The emergence of a variety of technical and social innovations and their 
successful testing lead to a new round of extensive World System growth. This 
is a very important fact, which attracts little attention, but it is the expan-
sion of modernization that enhances the momentum of the A-phase. Expan-
sion of modernization (combined with technological and social innovations) 
leads to the expansion and reconfiguration of the World System, which creates 
the need for a change in relations within the World System. Results of the ex-
tended modernization become visible in 10–15 years. By this time, prices can 
reach very high scores; many large ‘bubbles’ emerge in the economy under the 
influence of excessive demand for resources. However, the momentum of mod-
ernization loses its original strength. In a situation of prolonged overheating of 
the economy, such a slowdown leads to various kinds of difficulties and in-
creased global competition, the burst of bubbles, and Juglar crises. Finally, we 
see the transition to a B-cluster of J-cycles (and to a B-phase of the following 
K-wave). 
We also note that one can observe as a result of the development of each  
J-cycle cluster the change of the businessmen generations, their approach to 
doing business, the attitude to the different parameters, etc. Thus, again, the 
idea of generational change influence on the alteration of K-wave phases may 
also find its place in the synthetic theory of the K-waves.  
Main Principles for the Development of the K-Wave Model  
So, to summarize. The alteration of the K-wave upswings and downswings is 
determined by the following points: 
a) Both trends (upward and downward) are always present, which, inci-
dentally, can be clearly seen in the continuous alternation of J-cycle phases of 
rise and recession; 
b) periodically some trend is amplified at the expense of another at the lev-
el of both medium length cycles and long waves;  
c) the development of every trend is initially enhanced by some sort of pos-
itive feedback; 
g) but the strengthening of this trend eventually leads to its weakening and 
the strengthening of the countertrend;  
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d) in other words, the phase change mechanism is defined by the switching 
time of negative feedback, which leads to the increase in strength of the coun-
tertrend; 
e) thus, there is a time lag that is essential for the generating of cyclical dy-
namics; 
g) the nature of the medium-term cycles and their phases are the most im-
portant signals to business and society, defining the model of their strategy; 
h) more active (in the B-phase) or less active (during the A-phase) innova-
tive-reforming activities are the most important factor affecting the occurrence 
of negative feedback, and the latter ultimately leads to a change in the phase of 
K-waves. 
Phase Alteration in the K-Wave Model  
When the A-phase (upward trend) begins, this puts into action the positive 
feedback effect in the form of investment, growth in demand (reinforcing the 
rise in prices and GDP) and other activity that warms up the economy. This 
positive relationship operates at the level of individual companies and inter-
societal contacts (trade, financial flows, etc.). Furthermore one observes a new 
level of positive feedback – the World System – due to the fact that in the 
World System the modernization process accelerates as a whole under the in-
fluence of growth and success thanks to the emergence at the B-phase of a sys-
tem of technical, financial and social innovations. This leads to a temporary 
acceleration of positive feedback and delay the appearance of negative feed-
back. This lag (taking into account the point that the World System moderniza-
tion is a fairly lengthy process) can be about 10–20 years. But when moderniza-
tion is on the wane the negative feedback mechanisms start being felt as a reac-
tion to excessive overheating of the preceding period: reducing demand, falling 
prices, falling profit margins, decrease of investment activity, etc. As a result, 
the downward trend begins to dominate, and a new B-phase starts.  
With the start of a B-phase a certain positive feedback mechanism starts 
working, as over some time one can observe the strengthening of the process by 
which within the World System more and more economic agents and even 
whole countries begin to experience difficulties and to change their strategies 
(to reduce investments, to reduce costs, not to pay debts, etc.). In other words 
there is a natural chain reaction of negative momentum transfer through the 
World System. Further, this positive feedback is strengthened and stretched in 
time due to the fact that the necessary changes in the societies were not made in 
due time (in phase A), and most importantly – due to the fact that the emer-
gence and launch of necessary social (and other) innovations require quite a 
long time.  
This lag is also estimated to be about 10–20 years (taking into account the 
need to change policy, to enact laws, etc.). One should keep in mind periodical-
ly occurring temporary improvements (in expansion phases of J-cycles) that, 
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paradoxically, hinder the process of change in society. Finally, after the intro-
duction of such social innovations (which generally add up to the overall sys-
tem with other types of innovation: technical, financial, etc.), and after they 
begin to show its effectiveness, a negative feedback starts to be felt, which 
leads to a decrease in negative trends and strengthening of the upward trend. 
And as these phenomena emerge at least within one or a few societies of the 
World System, the upward momentum of them gets distributed throughout the 
whole world. A new A-phase begins, which accelerates the positive feedback 
due to the introduction of sets of innovations, which again leads to an extension 
of the World System or growth of its complexity.  
This system of relationships is graphically represented at the end of this ar-
ticle in Figs. 10 and 11.  
4. Relationships Between К-Waves and J-Cycles 
К-Waves and J-Cycle clusters  
J-cycle clusterization. As has already been mentioned, the most mysterious 
moment in K-waves is their relatively stable duration (as well as the relatively 
stable duration of their phases – respectively, 40–60 years and 20–30 years). 
None of the theories has been able to explain this phenomenon satisfactorily; 
none of them has been able to clearly separate economic or social factors that 
would clarify the reasons behind such rhythm. In our opinion, the only real fac-
tor that can set the pace of certain duration of Kondratieff waves and their 
phases are Juglar cycles. We would like to underline again that the J-cycles 
appear in the ontological sense more real than K-waves, hence these are  
J-cycles that should be considered as basic structural units, creating in the total-
ity of their processes K-waves and their phases (and not vice versa).  
In the analysis of such a relationship between J-cycles and K-waves it is 
necessary to take into account the point that in addition to general model prop-
erties of J-cycles one can identify more common properties for groups of near-
by J-cycles. These properties are derived not only from their greatest historical 
proximity, but also from the fact that they have a general trend, as well as from 
the fact that the nature of their crisis-depressive phases and phases of growth 
and prosperity has certain properties in common.  
Thus, J-cycles can be seen not just as structural units of the same type, but 
as a more complex system that represents a single chain/cluster of two, three or 
more J-cycles possessing within the cluster additional common features.  
It appears necessary to emphasize that: a) such clusters of J-cycles tend to 
have a duration of roughly 20–30 years (assuming that the cycle is 7–11 years, 
then three cycles in duration constitute 21–33 years), which correspond to aver-
age lengths of K-wave phases; b) an organic link between the J-cycles and  
K-waves is particularly supported by the fact that the phase boundaries of Kon-
dratieff waves (as well as boundaries of particular waves themselves) in many 
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theories practically coincide with the boundaries of certain medium-term cycles 
and crises.33 
The character of J-cycle clusters correlates with the character of K-wave 
phases. Of course, this cannot be accidental; actually, this is rather accounted 
for by certain mechanisms of reaction of particular societies and the World Sys-
tem to J-cycles.34 Incidentally, it appears necessary to note that the ratio be-
tween the extreme values of duration periods of K-waves (40–60 years) and  
J-cycles (7–11) is very similar: 7 : 11 ~ = 0.64 ~ 40 : 60 = 0.66. 
On the Correlation between J-Cycles and K-Wave Phases 
As was already established by Kondratieff, within upswing phases of K-waves 
J-cycles are characterized by stronger expansions and weaker depressions, 
whereas within K-wave downswings a contrary pattern is observed.  
Nikolay Kondratieff himself addressed the analysis by Arthur Spiethoff 
(Kondratieff 2002: 380). Below is Spiethoff's table (Table 3). The other re-
searchers' analysis proves Kondratieff's assertions concerning the proportions 
between the number of contraction and growth years at different phases of K-
waves. In particular, William Mitchell (1913)35 concluded that within the long-
term inflationary trends (i.e., at the A-phase of the K-wave), the phases of 
growth and depressive phases in Juglar cycles with respect to the USA are in 
the ratio 2.7 : 1, and in the periods of prolonged deflation (i.e., at the B-phase of 
the K-wave) the ratio is only 0.85 : 1. Alvin Hansen, who used to be rather 
sceptical of the K-waves theories, nevertheless, found that for the period from 
1872 to 1920 (i.e., second – third K-wave) during the upward rise in prices (at 
the A-phase), an average duration of depression was two years, and at the 
downtrend (the B-phase) it was 5.3 years. And conversely, the respective rises 
at the A-phase were by 1.8 times longer than at the B-phase (Hansen 1951). We 
interpreted these calculations in the Table 3.  
                                                          
33 Initially long waves were considered as combinations of a few adjacent medium-term business 
cycles (Burns and Mitchell 1946; van der Zwan 1980; Delbeke 1987; van Duijn 1983). These 
were still regarded as a sort of rather mechanical combination, whereas the idea that adjacent J-
cycles could form a real system was expressed very rarely and was not developed in any signifi-
cant way. 
34 Some researchers speak about a tight connection between Kuznets cycles and K-waves (see, e.g., 
Rumyantseva 2003; Akaev, Rumyantseva et al. 2011). We do not exclude the possibility that 
such a connection does exist. However, Kuznets swings have been detected mostly in the USA 
(see Kuznets 1958; Abramovitz 1961: 230; Hansen 1951; see also Akaev, Rumyantseva et al. 
2011: 91), whereas the J-cycles may be traced in all the main countries of the World System. In 
addition, Kuznets cycles are much less pronounced and do not have so dramatic crisis phase; that 
is why there is some sense in the prevalent tendency to denote them as ‘swings’, rather than as 
‘cycles’. 
35 See also: Burns and Mitchell 1946: 438.  
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Table 3. The correlation between the years of upswing and  
depression at the A- and B-phases according to Spiethoff 
Periods Upswing years Depressive years 
The downswing of the long cycle 
from 1822 to 1843 
9 12 
The upswing of the long cycle from 
1843 to 1874 
21 10 
The downswing of the long cycle 
from 1874 to 1895 
6 15 
The upswing of the long cycle from 
1895 to 1912 
15 4 
Table 4. The correlation between the duration of upswing and  
depression phases according to some economists 
Economist А-phase В-phase 
A. Spiethoff 2.5 : 1 0.6 : 1 
W. Mitchell 2.7 : 1 0.85 : 1 
A. Hansen 3 : 1 0.75 : 1 
 
Modern data on characteristics of upswings and recessions for 1919–1994 peri-
od confirm the presence of this regularity – the lengthening of expansion phas-
es during K-wave upswings and the lengthening of recession phases during  
K-wave downswings (for details see Rumyantseva 2003: 25).  
Thus, we can speak of two types of chain-clusters of J-cycles characterized 
by specific boom-depression patterns: 1) at upswing phases of K-waves J-cycle 
depressions are less pronounced, and J-cycle expansions are more durable; 2) at 
downswing phases of K-waves J-cycle depressions are more pronounced, and 
J-cycle expansions are less intense and prolonged. Accordingly, the first type of 
J-cycle chain-clusters can be called ‘A-clusters’, whereas the second type can 
be denoted as ‘B-clusters’.  
As has already been mentioned, the relationship between K-waves and  
J-cycles has not been studied quite sufficiently. Recall that Kondratieff pointed 
out that J-cycles are a sort of interwoven within K-waves and depend on the 
latter. In particular, he wrote, ‘The long waves belong really to the same com-
plex dynamic process in which the intermediate cycles [i.e., J-cycles. L. G.,  
A. K.] of the capitalistic economy with their principal phases of upswing and 
depression run their course. These intermediate cycles, however, secure a cer-
tain stamp from the very existence of the long waves. Our investigation demon-
strates that during the rise of the long waves, years of prosperity are more nu-
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merous, whereas years of depression predominate during the downswing’ 
(Kondratieff 1935: 111).  
However, it seems that the relationship between K-waves and J-cycles is 
not only significantly deeper and more complex, but – most importantly –the 
causal relationship between them in general looks different. Hence, Kon-
dratieff was not quite correct when he contended that the nature of J-
cycles depended on the nature of the respective K-wave phases; the actual 
situation seems to be simply the opposite – this is the nature of the respec-
tive J-cycle clusters that largely determines the nature of the respective K-
wave phases.  
This view on the causal relationship between the two types of cycles 
emerges from the fact that Juglar cycles are more observable empirically than 
K-waves, which, in the words of Maevsky (1992: 58), ‘appear as a kind of sur-
real force that cannot be perceived directly’. The factors that produce J-cycles 
are also clearer and better described. Moreover, the presence of these factors 
has been confirmed ‘experimentally’, because more than half a century of eco-
nomic regulation in many countries has proved that the course of Juglar cycles 
can be influenced by certain measures of economic policy that this course can 
be modified, and in some cases the critical phase of those cycles can be even 
avoided. In the meantime any successful attempts to influence consciously the 
course of Kondratieff waves do not appear to be known.36 
5. General Causes and Mechanisms of Economic Cycles  
J-cycles and K-waves arise from the general properties of the industrial econo-
my – the ability of expanded reproduction (on this feature see, e.g., Kuznets 
1966; Gellner 1983; Abramovitz 1961; Poletaev and Saveljeva 1993; Grinin 
2003, 2006a, 2007a, 2007b, 2009b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012). Economic 
growth cannot go on constantly and continuously; therefore, slowdowns are 
inevitable; and those slowdowns can only be overcome through qualitative 
changes. Thus, the constant expansion and development imply that the structure 
within whose framework this development takes place, sometime should be 
substantially modified. Especially such changes should occur as a result of 
technological revolutions (see, e.g., Perez 2002, 2010, 2011, 2012; Grinin 
2003, 2009b). But, as a rule, such a change lags behind the more dynamic eco-
nomic (technological) component underlying the expanded economic growth. 
Therefore, this change occurs in the form of more or less severe crises that, in 
fact, generate cyclical fluctuations.  
                                                          
36 Note that reality of medium-term cycles is recognized by many (though still not all) economists 
that is expressed in the fact that in most textbooks on macroeconomics these cycles are discussed 
in special chapters or sections (see, e.g., Mankiw 1994: Ch. 14; Sacks and Larren 1996: Ch. 17; 
Abel and Bernanke 2008a: Ch. 8), whereas reality of long Kondratieff cycles recognized minority 
of economists (and – consequently – references to them in Economics textbooks are either absent 
or very scarce).  
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There are certain important (and not random) similarities between J-cycles 
and K-waves in terms of their ‘structure’ as regards some cyclical factors and 
certain properties of cyclical processes. The understanding of those similarities 
must be able to further clarify the mechanisms of interaction between those 
different cycles. There are also important similarities both in terms of the nature 
and mechanisms of transmission of impulses (leading to the generation of  
J-cycles and K-waves) from one country to another within the framework of the 
World System. Both cycles never occur only within a particular society, they 
always extend beyond individual societies and are somehow connected with the 
world-system processes. This is all the more important that J-cycles (especially 
J-crises) always tend to become global, or at least taking place simultaneously 
in a number of societies. Thus, through J-cycle ups and downs within the World 
System momentum of growth and decline is transmitted very quickly and fairly 
synchronously. But, of course, for the K-wave dynamics Juglar cycles within 
the World System leaders are of special importance. 
6. Mechanism of Influence of J-Cycles on the Temporal Rhythm 
of K-Wave Alteration  
Emergence and Resolution of Societal Structural Crisis within A- and 
B-Clusters of J-Cycles  
How can medium-term cycles affect the dynamics of upward and downward 
phases of long cycles?  
Mechanism of change in phase K-wave, its A-phase with respect to its de-
pendence on J-cycle looks like this (see also the end of this article, Figs 10 and 
11). More severe in their manifestations, the crises/depressive phases of  
J-cycles at a downswing K-wave phase inevitably require from societies deeper 
and more radical changes, not only in technical and technological aspect, but 
also in social, legal, political, ideological, and cultural aspects, as well as in the 
field of international relations and world-system links. Otherwise, a society will 
not be able to overcome the negative effects of economic crisis and come out of 
depression.  
Only a profound change in many different areas of society, as well as new 
approaches to the regulation of the economy allow eventually the transition to a 
significant expansion.37 This has already been discussed earlier. The cluster 
structure of two J-cycles (see Fig. 11) can be schematically represented as fol-
lows: the first cycle – awareness of the difficulties and search for counter-
depression and reformist measures, the second cycle – the introduction of anti-
crisis measures and their first results. With three cycles the following pattern 
can be identified (see Fig. 10): the first cycle – awareness of the difficulties, the 
                                                          
37 Recall that Americans and Europeans had to carry out very deep reforms during and especially 
after the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s (see Lan 1976; Kindleberger 1973) 
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second – search for counter-depression and reformist measures and their appli-
cation, and the third cycle – the time required to develop the result.  
Ultimately the struggle with depressions, conducted changes, as well as in-
troduced innovative technologies lead to the replacement of a J-cycle B-cluster 
with an A-cluster (and, thus, to the transition from a K-wave downswing to a 
K-wave upswing). 
As a result, there is a transition to a new system of relations, which opens 
the possibility for economies to develop in the coming decades without so 
strong crisis manifestations.38 However, since further development proceeds in 
a relatively soft way, the need for reforming and modernizing relations weak-
ens. Accordingly, the society experiences insufficient changes compared with 
those that are necessary to re-start rapid growth, whereas any cycle is associat-
ed with an increase in structural economic, social, political and other problems. 
And if they are not resolved, this will lead to the amplification of negative 
trends, as a result of which rapid economic growth becomes impossible, or 
there are internal and international problems leading to various crises. Within 
about three J-cycles potential of free growth is exhausted, and the problems are 
accumulating. Next there is a powerful crisis, triggering a more or less protract-
ed depression. As a result, an upswing A-cluster of J-cycles is replaced with a 
downswing B-cluster that corresponds to the K-wave B-phase.  
Thus, it is through the medium-term economic cycles in the downward 
phase of the K-wave conditions are being prepared for the transition to the 
K-wave upswing. The stronger the crises, the weaker the expansions, and the 
more intense the structural changes. In turn, less painful crisis-depressive phas-
es of J-cycles at K-wave upswings causes them to turn downswing phases (this 
is the turn after certain euphoria, and we had an ‘honor’ to observe such a de-
velopment in the late 2000s and the early 2010s). That is why the most severe 
crises are crises at the turning points from the K-wave upswings to the K-wave 
downswings (in particular, the crisis of 1847, 1873, 1929, 1973, as well as the 
current global crisis that started in 2008. 
So, in the upswing phase, when there is a more intensive growth, cyclical 
crises resemble a kind of ‘stumbling when scooting’, when excessive speed 
leads to inevitable stops and setbacks. However, within A-clusters J-cycles are 
lesser related to each other; they are rather more similar to isolated events. 
These are crisis of growth, during which structural problems within societies 
(and in general within the World System) get accumulated. At the downward 
phases of the K-wave crises are very different. They are much more closely 
related to each other, either directly, so that the next crisis is a sort of continua-
tion of the first (e.g., the crisis of 1937 was a sort of continuation of the previ-
                                                          
38 Menshikov and Klimenko (1989) use the following metaphor – they say that ‘society changes its 
skin’ while going through a Kondratieff wave.  
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ous crisis that started in 1929), or they go against a common negative back-
ground (e.g., the cycles of 1875–1895 period went against the background of a 
protracted agrarian crisis, and the J-cycle crises of 1971–1982 period went 
against the background of currency, commodity and energy crises). This is ex-
plained by the fact that such crises are structural in nature, as they resolve com-
plex structural problems that were accumulated in the previous upswing period. 
Moreover, military, political or revolutionary crises (as well as world wars) fit 
rather well in those downward phases, as those crises act as the components of 
a general world-system crisis that make people change the relationship struc-
ture within the World System . In short, these are structural crises that lead 
to structural changes.  
Additional Notes 
An Example of More Active Social Activities during K-Wave  
B-Phases in Comparison with K-Wave A-Phases 
To illustrate the idea that in the economically prosperous periods of a K-wave 
A-phase societies tend to change less than in the period of crisis in depressive 
phases, we analyze the average annual number of days of meetings of the U.S. 
Congress since 1790 to the present. At the same time we have moved the origin 
period for meetings' calculations for each phase by five years as this can be 
estimated as average minimum time required for an adequate understanding of 
the situation (i.e., schedule for Column 4 lag behind the respective schedule for 
column 3 by five years).  
Table 5. Number of days of sessions of the US Congress correspond-
ing to different K-waves and their phases  
K-wave 
seria-
number 
K-wave phase 
K-wave 
phase  
datings39 
Corresponding 
periods of Congress 
sessions40 
Overall 
number 
of ses-
sion 
days  
Average 
number 
of ses-
sion 
days per 
year  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I 
A: upswing 1789–1817 1794–1822 
(29 years)
4263 147 
B: downswing 1818–1847 1823–1852 
(30 years)
4931 164,4 
II 
A: upswing 1848–1873 1853–1878 
(26 years)
4820 185,4 
B: downswing 1874–1893 1879–1898 
(20 years)
3904 195,2 
                                                          
39 The dates in this column do not take into account versions of the starts and ends of various phases 
mentioned in Table 5. 
40 Taking the five-year lag into account (see above). 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
III 
A: upswing 1894–1929 1899–1934  
(36 years) 
7242 201,2 
B: downswing 1930–1948 1935–1953  
(19 years) 
5475 288 
IV 
A: upswing 1949–1968 1954–1973  
(20 years) 
5737 287 
B: downswing 1969–1982 1974–1987  
(14 years) 
4495 321 
V 
A: upswing 1983–
200641 
1988–200642 
(19years) 
6077 32043 
B: downswing    ? 
Source: LLSDC. n. d. URL: http://www.llsdc.org/assets/sourcebook/sess-congress.pdf  
Fig. 8. Correlation between K-wave phases and average number of 
the US Congress session days per year (taking the five-year 
lag into account, version 1) 
 
Note. The point that the average number of session days per year at B-phases is higher than 
at A-phases is more visible as regards the 3rd and 4th K-waves (rather than the 1st and 
the 2nd). It appears necessary to note the following in this respect: 
                                                          
41 In this phase we took the period preceding the 2007–2010 crisis. 
42 Within this phase we have taken the period preceding the start of the crisis.  
43 Which is less than in the B-phase of the 4th K-wave. We can forecast that during the B-phase of 
the 5th K-wave the average number of the US Congress sessions per year will be higher. 
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1. The situation reflects the fact that since the late 19th century governments started 
paying much more attention to economic problems than earlier. 
2. As regards the 2nd wave, one should take into account that its B-phase was rather 
peaceful, whereas its A-phase includes the periods of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
of the South when the Congress had to work more intensively. 
If we only consider the peaceful part of the K-wave A-phase, the distribution of the 
US Congress session time looks as follows:  
1853–1861 – 1480 days of the US Congress sessions in nine years (on average 164.4 
days per year);  
1870–1878 – 1600 days of the US Congress sessions in nine years (on average 177.8 
days per year).  
Thus, altogether for all the peaceful years of the 2nd K-wave A-phase – on average 
171.1 days per year, which is substantially less than 195.2 days per year attested for the 
2nd K-wave B-phase;  
1862–1869 (war-and-reconstruction period) – 1740 days of the US Congress ses-
sions in eight years (on average 217.5 days per year). As we see a higher level of aver-
age annual US Congress sessions at the 2nd K-wave A-phase is connected with this diffi-
cult period of the US history.  
As regards the 3rd K-wave, war periods are found at both A- and B-phases.  
A graphic picture of this pattern is presented in Fig. 9.  
 
Fig. 9. Average annual number of days of the US Congress sessions 
in their relationship with K-waves and their phases (taking the 
five-year lag into account, version 2: taking into consideration 
the 2nd K-wave A-phase) 
Note. Fig. 9 displays the relationship between the number of the US Congress sessions 
at the A-phases and B-phases of K-waves with the elimination of the war-and-
reconstruction years (1862–1869). Here it is especially visible that within all the 
documented K-waves the respective society paid more attention to necessary 
changes during the downswing B-phases. 
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Social Innovations as a Factor of K-Wave Interphase  
Transitions at the Level of Individual Societies, the Level  
of Intersocietal Interactions, and the World-System Level  
It appears rather important to emphasize that, though the change of K-wave 
phases is connected with the exhaustion of the potential of respective techno-
logical paradigms,44 its immediate factors include first of all behavior of partic-
ular economic agents (including the state institutions), which is very tightly 
connected with psychological sets of businessmen and political elites. When 
development accelerates at the A-phase, this stimulates additional investment 
activities. In contrast, during phases of depression society is actively seeking 
opportunities to minimize losses, and to re-introduce the accelerating growth 
trend. During the past two centuries more and more forces joined the agents of 
economic development in their attempts to re-start the upswings; and these in-
cluded government, state and interstate agencies, education institutions, ideolo-
gy, science, etc. These are the activities of all those forces that lead to the even-
tual end of the downswing and the start of a new upswing.45 
Here it appears possible to expand Schumpeter's idea (Schumpeter 1939, 
1949 [1911]) regarding innovators as well as the creative destruction; many 
economists like this idea, but they do not appear to apply it in a sufficient way. 
In fact, in the innovators of all kinds of social activities during downswing 
phases have more opportunities to implement their innovations: politicians who 
promise to solve economic problems, reformers, legislators, scientists, etc. 
The ideas that begin to be discussed and implemented, could be expressed for a 
long time, limited experiments could be carried out much earlier (or in other 
countries), but it is during the times of difficulties when clusters of reform and 
change appear. The solution for the difficulties can be found – ceteris paribus – 
in those societies where depressive manifestations of the crisis are stronger. 
Ultimately, innovative changes begin to work, to spread and to give effect, in 
particular they contribute to the diffusion of financial and technological innova-
tions (in other words, a new innovative synthesis emerges). Thus, we should 
talk about innovations and innovators of all kinds, including social innovators 
and innovations. Thus, effective methods to counter crisis are beginning to 
spread, and, like technological innovations, they may be borrowed by modern-
izing societies with a significant delay, but in a completely ready form. 
The wider this process of reforms is conceptualized, the more opportunities can 
be found for economic growth and the longer can be the upswing. In particular, 
                                                          
44 In the widest possible sense of this notion, i.e., the one that includes financial, social, cultural, 
and political technologies.  
45 It appears necessary to note that social innovations are not always found, or they may turn out not 
to be quite effective, or blind-alley innovations emerge (e.g., in Nazi Germany); in these cases 
crises could be especially destructive – and not only economically (as these was, e.g., observed in 
the case of World War II).  
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this explains economic successes in several post-World War II European coun-
tries and Japan (economic ‘miracles’) in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as some 
modern achievements of China actively using the whole arsenal of counter-
cyclical measures developed in Western countries. At the same time, taking 
into account the point that the Chinese leadership has more opportunities to 
effectively pursue such policies than the governments of the countries with full 
market economies status, the results of counter-cyclical policies in China are 
indeed very impressive.  
Time lags. Intensification of modernization processes within the World 
System. But the emergence of a major social innovation (effective in combat-
ing new manifestations of depression) may not be a quick thing. Therefore, 
although a collision with difficulties initially causes frequently active, signifi-
cant anti-crisis actions, yet they do not lead to profound changes. A considera-
ble time must elapse before a new innovative system starts working. This may 
take up to ten years or even more. In the meantime, on the one hand, during the 
B-phase social innovations lag behind, because they are only beginning to be 
implemented sometime after its first third (or even later), and they can only be 
implemented during the second third (or later). And on the other hand, in fact, 
they give their real effect toward the end of the B-phase. However, early in the 
A-phase social innovations get implemented fully. As a result, when the up-
swing is already underway, the inertia of social change further accelerates the 
A-phase. Conversely, at the beginning of a downward phase we deal with an-
other sort of inertia when the society is not ready to change, which, according-
ly, further aggravates the B-phase.  
Within the B-cluster of three J-cycles one can observe the emergence of a 
set of technological, financial, and social innovations, which leads to an accel-
erated modernization of the semi-periphery, that accelerates the A-phase up-
swing due to faster growth and increased demand (including the state de-
mand).46 Gradually these innovations add up to a system, which is adopted by 
‘catching up’ societies. This further explains the inertia force of the upswing: in 
the first J-cycle of the A-phase one can see belated reforms that would have to 
be carried out at the B-phase, while during the second J-cycle imitation reforms 
may be carried out.  
Thus, the successful implementation of social innovations against the crisis 
in advanced countries during the B-phase and the transition to the A-phase is a 
signal for many ‘catching up’/ modernizing countries. This is amplified by a 
certain excess of capitals in the core countries of the World System, as at  
B-phase those capitals are not in enough demand. Modernizing countries are 
beginning to implement not only technical and economic, but also social tech-
                                                          
46 It appears appropriate to note that many social innovations/counter-crisis technologies emerge 
not in the central societies of the World System but in those societies that aspire to become cen-
tral.  
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nologies. This leads to both more powerful process of modernization in the 
World System in the A-phase than in the B-phase, and to a more rapid growth 
of economically active parts of the World System, but also to a more rapid 
spread of impulses throughout the World System. All together this creates a 
new situation in the World System, which is very sensitive to the exhaustion of 
the potency to develop. Therefore, the crisis, which eventually captures the 
World System center, has an impact to some extent on all at once.  
Additional note on the diffusion of technologies. During the A-phase a 
more active modernization of peripheral countries is usually connected with the 
adoption of such technologies that can be hardly characterized as the most ad-
vanced. Rather, these are technologies of the previous wave. Thus, the most 
advanced technologies remain in the leading countries. But the core technolo-
gies of the previous generation are moved from advanced countries (as this was 
observed, e.g., in the 1990s). Such outsourcing has disadvantages (structural 
unemployment, etc.), but it also has some pluses, since it clears the advanced 
countries physically from the old technologies (this is also a kind of innovation 
at the level of the World System). If such technologies remain and are artificial-
ly supported by the state, the leaders start losing their leading positions (as this 
happened to Britain with her textile and coal industries). 
What Limits the Length of the K-Wave A-Phases?  
Economists have long pondered over the question, ‘why prosperity does not 
last indefinitely’ (Mitchell 1913: 452, cited in Hansen 1951). And in the early 
20th century they suggested that the prosperity and decline should be explained 
by the processes occurring regularly within the economy itself (Mitchell 1913: 
452–468, cited by: Hansen 1951). We also maintain that growth, although it is 
an essential feature of the industrial and post-industrial economy, does not oc-
cur automatically, but requires sustained efforts.47 The faster the growth, the 
more effort is required, and thus, at some point the system confronts the law of 
diminishing returns, that is, for each new point of growth more effort is re-
quired. Already because of this the rise cannot be infinite.  
However, the question arises, why the upswing is limited to a certain peri-
od? Above we have explained the reasons for such time constraints. This sec-
tion will discuss the aspects of the new restrictions, and additionally shows 
some aspects of the relationship of K-waves and J-cycles.  
The reasons that, as a rule, the A-phase does not last more than three or 
four J-cycles are connected with the following points:  
• with the exhaustion of resources or growth factors (that are necessary to 
ensure upswing dynamics);  
• with the inflated optimism about the prospects for business growth, which 
is also reflected in the excessive increase in the value of assets;  
                                                          
47 Internal impulse to the growth created the desire of businessmen to increase their profits, as well 
as the desire of population to increase the standard of living and consumption.  
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• with the emergence of long depression pauses in those J-cycles that are 
situated at the border of upswing and downswing phases of K-waves, which 
leads to changes of business development strategies.  
In this case the first two points in K-waves and J-cycles are substantially 
similar, and the last point is specific only for the long-term processes, that is, 
for K-waves. The latter point is part of what can be called the factor of duration 
recessive-depressive phases of J-cycles. In our opinion, it is very important for 
understanding the causes of the shifts from K-wave upswings to downswings. 
The fact is that if crisis pauses are brief, they generally do not change dramati-
cally business strategy vector in the direction of growth and investment. During 
prolonged crisis-depressive phases of J-cycles business strategies can be truly 
reversed.  
Let us consider these reasons in detail. 
Exhaustion of growth factors 
The upswing weakening is due to the exhaustion of available resources (factors 
promoting growth) in the broadest sense of the word. We believe that during 
the A-phase consumption of resources for growth (outstripping their creation) 
is much faster. As a result, after some time, the resources are exhausted, and the 
upward movement of the economic inevitably slows down and stops (as, in the 
conditions of a certain level of technology, resources are always limited). Ac-
cordingly, at B-phases accumulation of potential resources runs ahead of their 
consumption. 
Note that we speak about ‘resources’ in the widest possible sense of this 
word – that is about technological, financial, innovatory, social, demographic 
(and so on) resources both at the societal level and at the level of the World 
System.  
In particular, important resources are needed to continue the recovery; they 
include new business technologies (including financial technologies), expan-
sion of markets, removal of obstacles for exchange, trade, export, easy move-
ment of capital; free capital themselves; unsatisfied effective demand for some 
important goods and services; a number of important unimplemented innova-
tions, etc. Finally, this is the willingness of states to invest and support business 
processes. Within the framework of the World System these are societies that 
are ready to modernize, etc. 
During A-phases resource consumption rates tend to be higher than during 
the phase of resource accumulation due to a rather simple reason: the main at-
tention of business is attracted by the expansion of production, investment and 
so on, which, by definition, implies a rather high rate of resource consumption 
(note that these also include credit resources).48 
For the emergence of additional powerful impulses qualitative changes are 
required. For this kind of qualitative changes the society needs major restruc-
                                                          
48 It reminds accelerated mining operations during the boom without intensive investment in explo-
ration. Accordingly, the amount of proven reserves decreases.  
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turing and the involvement of new resources that will not happen automatically, 
but requires considerable time.  
Thus, an A-phase (upswing) gives place to a B-phase (downswing); during 
the B-phase one can observe not only the systemic restructuring, but also the 
accumulation of many resources, including both innovations (e.g., Schumpeter 
1982, 1939) and such conventional resources as capital that is not invested.49 
It is important to understand that after a long period of weak growth, in-
terrupted by crises and depressions (i.e., after the B-phase), the momentum to 
accelerate new K-wave can take place only in the presence of large amounts of 
resources and growth factors. Synchronism in the rise is achieved because a 
certain set of resources is required for it, and because one innovation may lead 
to innovations in other areas; on the other hand, free capital contribute to the 
acceleration of modernization, whereas development of modernization con-
stantly requires new capital, and so on.  
The immediate impetus to the growth of a K-wave is given, as already 
mentioned, at the recovery stage of one of J-cycles, and the mechanism for the 
transition from depression to recovery has been already described many times 
(see, e.g., Mitchell 1930; Hansen 1951). Thus, the mechanism has a great simi-
larity to the transition from growth to slow down and new growth within J-
cycles and K-waves. This mechanism is associated with the rapid depletion of 
resources in the period of growth and boom, leading to a rapid increase in their 
prices, and then the accumulation of resources during the recession, until finally 
the abundance of resources will not push the economy to a new upsurge. But 
only the acceleration of the K-wave A-phase (in contrast to the transition from 
depression phase to phase of recovery within the J-cycle) requires qualitatively 
different resources: technological and social innovations, new modernizing 
societies, new technologies, etc. 
Excessive business optimism about the prospects for growth 
and the revaluation of assets 
Many projects and investments, which are carried out in the growth phases of J-
cycle, are designed to be carried out during rather long periods of time. As stat-
ed earlier, if the recessive depressive phases are short, the processes of invest-
ment and growth do not lose momentum, nor – that is very important – psycho-
logical confidence. As a result, with a short recessive gap various projects get 
suspended less frequently.  
As we have seen, short recessions are typical for K-wave upswing phases, 
when growth factors (resources) have not been exhausted yet. 
However, after the first (and even more so after the second) relatively fa-
vorable J-cycle (with short phases of recession and depression) one can observe 
                                                          
49 For example, Tugan-Baranovsky (2008 [1913]) connected economic upswing impulses precisely 
with this factor.  
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in business and society the growth of optimism (the desire and courage to in-
vest profitably), which is in opposition with the diminishing growth resources. 
In the A-phase, the revaluation of assets (stocks, real estate, commodities, 
etc.) is also associated with a lengthy economic growth and bullish price trend, 
which leads to excessive demand for some resources, large scale speculation 
and the emergence of ‘bubbles’. Dramatic overestimation of the value of assets 
is connected with the increasing demand for resources and the growth of unjus-
tified assumptions that asset prices will rise further. In fact, the situation is 
evolving in a pyramid-like way (whereas the ‘pyramid’ is becoming more and 
more unstable every month). Below we will see that it is at the moment of the 
greatest depletion of resources (and at the same time the greatest weakening of 
the growth potential – both occur by the end of the last J-cycle of the A-phase) 
the unreasonable optimism among the businessmen about the future growth in 
asset prices is peaking.50 
It is clear that, as a result of the collapse, the asset revaluation occurs with a 
minus sign (which is especially noticeable during the acute phase of the crisis). 
Long depression pause emerging within border J-cycles and 
the change of development strategy 
As we have seen, the duration of a recessive-depressive phases of J-cycles is 
important for understanding the dynamics of K-wave phase changes. Mean-
while, after two (sometimes three) J-cycles in which these phases have been 
short, in the third (sometimes fourth) A-phase J-cycle the duration of the reces-
sive-depressive period qualitatively increases. Thus, the respective J-cycle be-
comes a landmark between the A- and B-phases of the respective K-wave.  
An increase in the recessive-depressive phases is due to the coincidence of 
extreme values of divergent trends. On the one hand, the value of assets and the 
level of revaluation reach their peaks, and the optimism of businessmen and 
society as a whole is at apogee; on the other hand – the value of resources 
available for growth (growth factors) reaches a minimum.  
Simultaneously, in society and economy there are too many unresolved is-
sues. As a result, the recession acquires a very large scale, and attempts to 
overcome the crisis and continue to grow do not work out. And as there are not 
enough resources to resume the upward movement, there is an insufficient 
momentum to continue the A-phase upswing.  
Prolongation of recession and depression phases inevitably leads to chang-
es in business and social strategies.51 Of course, there is a significant difference 
                                                          
50 For example, Hansen (1951) demonstrates in a rather convincing way that during the Great De-
pression it became perfectly clear how completely resources of new construction had been used, 
which was one of the drivers of the rise in the 1920s. But the peak of the construction was 
achieved long before 1929, about 1925–1926. High demand for the construction of real estate at 
this time is explained by the fact that during the World War II, civil construction was almost en-
tirely frozen.  
51 On the society's strategy and its search for counter-crisis social innovations see above. 
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between a crisis that continues for a few months, and a depression that contin-
ues for several years. It is necessary to adapt to the new situation, and hence to 
reduce costs and volumes, while starting to rebuild the business and seek new 
ways for its development. Projects are suspended, investment declines, demand 
falls, prices (at least on revalued assets) are also falling, capitals are not invest-
ed, etc. Thus, there is a feedback loop: the longer the recessive period, the less 
investment, and vice versa – the less investment, the longer the recession. Then 
a new rise may start, but it will be of a different type (that is characteristic of  
J-cycles in the downward phase). To maintain upward trend after a fairly pro-
longed stagnation and depression a society needs an appropriate big enough 
momentum that cannot appear from nowhere (especially without the presence 
of effective anti-crisis social innovations).  
Thus, the question about the reasons for a certain duration of the A-phase 
of a K-wave is largely related to the question of the causes of sudden lengthen-
ing of depressive phases of the crisis of J-cycles (at the end of the A-cluster of 
those cycles). And this undoubtedly further demonstrates the close connection 
between the K-waves and J-cycles. 
It is also clear why during the B-phase the economy cannot gain earlier 
momentum. Firstly, it takes time to develop counter-crisis measures. Secondly, 
it is necessary to accumulate a sufficient amount of growth factors, including 
breakthrough technological innovations. Thirdly, you need a push to change the 
business strategy. Thus, a feedback loop gets established: weak expansions – 
inactive strategy – lack of investment – no impulses for a strong recovery – 
weak expansions, and so on. And this feedback loop may operate for a quite 
long period of time.  
7. THE DIMENSION OF THE WORLD SYSTEM 
Modernization and World-System Socioeconomic Crises  
Tensions of intensive modernization; relationship of the K-wave  
A-phases to semi-peripheral economic and social crises, as well as 
wars of certain types 
During upswings of the K-wave peripheral and semi-peripheral economic and 
political crises occur more frequently. Recall that already Kondratieff (1935: 
111) noted that ‘it is during the period of the rise of the long waves, i.e., during 
the period of high tension in the expansion of economic forces, that, as a rule, 
the most disastrous and extensive wars and revolutions occur’.  
This point requires further explanation. One should take into consideration 
that: a) semi-peripheral modernizing countries tend to borrow social innova-
tions rather fast; b) but often they do not have a sufficient basis for the ‘diges-
tion’ of such innovations (and social innovation can be for them altogether al-
ien). The result is what can be called ‘crises of modernization’, not only ex-
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pressed in economic crises, but also in revolutions and even wars.52 The Asian 
crisis of 1997 was largely such a modernization crisis. Revolutions of the early 
20th century can also be considered as such crises.  
As for the wars, of course, not all, but some of them may well be attributed 
to a reaction to the rapid modernization, as well as manifestations of the re-
structuring of the World System. In particular, major wars were connected with 
the formation of large nation-states in Europe in the 1850s–1870s (Italy, Ger-
many). The war factor will be discussed in more detail below. 
World-System Crises and Obstacles for the Emergence  
of the World-System Innovations. World-System Innovations 
and their Delays 
The increase in the World System modernization (combined with technological 
and social innovations) leads to the expansion and reconfiguration of the World 
System, that after some time creates the need for a change in relations within 
the World System. If the latter is delayed, then crises emerge, and those crises 
cannot be overcome within individual countries and through individual social 
innovations. In this case, the World System confronts a series of deep crises 
(as was observed in the period between 1914 and 1945).  
Thus, the development of the World System and modification of K-waves 
are closely interdependent. Accordingly, some phase of K-waves appears as 
special, as to exit from the crisis at some stage of the K-wave world-system 
solutions are necessary, and such innovations may be delayed. In particular, 
during the third wave (1890–1940s) one could observe a profound transfor-
mation of the World System, so the crises of its downswing acquired a military-
political form and generally were the most profound.  
Already in the early 20th century the World System encompassed, in fact, 
the entire Globe. The innovations at the level of individual countries were not 
sufficient (partly because of very strong protectionism, military and colonial 
rivalries). There were also very different political regimes. Hence, the further 
development required new world-systemic innovations in relations between the 
countries. However, at the level of the world-system the old ways of solving 
conflicts and problems were still operating and new ones did not yet succeed 
easily. As a result, the restructuring of the World System proceeded in the old 
military and revolutionary way.  
Only after the World War II, it became apparent that it is necessary to look 
for new innovative solutions at the World System level. But there was no im-
mediate feedback since there was no generally accepted model or supranational 
                                                          
52 They become even more dangerous if coincide with rapid population growth that is so character-
istic of the period of the escape from the Malthusian trap (for more details on the modernization 
crises see Korotayev, Zinkina, Kobzeva et al. 2011; Korotayev, Khaltourina, Malkov et al. 2010; 
Korotayev, Khaltourina, Kobzeva et al. 2011; Grinin, Korotayev, and Malkov 2009, 2010; Grinin 
2010a, 2011b). 
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bodies, and there were large differences between metropolises and colonies. As 
a result, some countries tried to counteract the crisis phenomena that are char-
acteristic for the World System as its whole in their own ways. At some stage 
there was a major contradiction: on the one hand, the interactions became very 
strong and more interdependent, and on the other – clashes between partici-
pants became sharper, some development models and social innovations (that 
were used by some states) were dangerous to others. As a result, the crisis be-
came more and more acute. Ultimately, the World-System contradictions esca-
lated into the huge World War II. Only in this way the world community finally 
managed to establish the leading model of development and common patterns 
of behavior in world markets at least in the main part of the World System, and 
in some major countries – to conduct the necessary social changes that are im-
portant for economic development around the world. In this, war gradually 
ceased to be the leading form of reconstruction of the World System.  
Today the situation is rather similar to the one observed in the early  
20th century. A serious reconfiguration of the World System is forthcoming, 
which implies a number of significant world-system innovations in the near 
future. However, the nature of those innovations is not clear yet. This may 
lead to the prolongation of depressive processes and aggravation of crisis 
phenomena (needless to mention that the military forms of the search for such 
innovations should be excluded nowadays). 
How does the K-Wave Synchronicity in the World System 
Emerge?  
To some extent, it reminds growth-generating mechanism in national econo-
mies, where growth points emerge, and those growth points – if they are power-
ful – pull the whole economy. On the other hand, we observe here the emer-
gence of such states that act as locomotives creating momentum for all. To a 
certain extent this is reflected in the theory of leading sectors and leading econo-
mies in the application to the World System (Modelski 1987; Modelski and 
Thompson 1996; Thompson 1990, 2000; Rasler and Thompson 1994; Rennstich 
2002). The leading sector leads a respective national economy, whereas the re-
spective leading economy leads the world economy. It is important that new 
counter-crisis technologies emerge, which are also gradually adopted; finally the 
states develop some common solutions that may evolve into the World System 
solutions. Downswing signals are transmitted in a similar way. 
Mechanism of relatively rapid momentum transfer from certain World Sys-
tem zones to its other areas is determined by the mechanisms of the World  
System economic relations: rising/falling world trade (including the effect of 
changes in import/export duties); movement of global capital (and the for-
mation of its new centers); currency (gold) fluctuations ; export/import of tech-
nology (patents); international agreements; fluctuations in the prices of raw 
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materials, fuel, food and other commodities. (see examples in Grinin 2011a, 
2013b; Korotayev, Zinkina, Bogevolnov, and Malkov  2011). Regardless of 
whether that was due to growth in certain countries, these mechanisms may 
well be changing development trends in the World System periphery or semi-
periphery, if they have been already changed in the World System core.  
If we take the transmission of impulses from the leading countries to the 
less developed or less actively developing ones throughout the K-wave,  
the connection with the J-cycles becomes more visible. During the period of 
one J-cycle (7–11 years) advantages of new technologies, organizational ar-
rangements, and other achievements (that have appeared in the leading country 
or countries) become more obvious. The second cycle starts with great intensity 
the modernization of a large number of countries. The third cycle extends mod-
ernization, but at this level there are already difficulties associated with the 
complexity of sharing as well as a fall in the rate of profit, and – very im-
portant – especially in the transformation of institutions and relationships both 
within individual countries and across the World System.  
8. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF K-WAVE EVOLUTION,  
FACTORS, MECHANISMS, AND INDICATORS 
How and Why do the Main K-Wave Dynamics Indicators 
Change?  
General direction of changes  
We have examined how K-waves and J-cycles interact. Let us now see how and 
why the main K-wave dynamics indicators change.  
As has already been mentioned above, Kondratieff himself and many re-
searchers after him believed that the main indicators of the upswing/downswing 
dynamics within the K-waves are associated with directions of price trends. But 
in recent decades this role is rather played by the relative GDP growth rate dy-
namics (Mandel 1975, 1980; see also Kuczynski 1980; Bieshaar and Klein-
knecht 1984; Kleinknecht 1987; Poletaev and Saveljeva 1993). Some research-
ers use other indicators, including class struggle indices.  
This inconsistency adds complexity to the measurement of K-waves: how 
can we talk about the long process of K-wave alteration, if the figures are dif-
ferent, and sometimes contradicting each other? K-waves in the price dynamics 
have the most recognized empirical support (see, e.g., Gordon 1978: 24; Van 
Ewijk 1982; Cleary and Hobbs 1983; Berry 1991, etc.). But the logic of K-
waves in price dynamics disappeared after the World War II, as then period 
prices tend to rise even during downswing phases.53 
At this stage, the attempts to detect K-wave dynamics in the global GDP 
(and similar indicators) have yielded rather conflicting results. In particular, 
empirical tests of some researchers did not confirm the presence of K-waves in 
the world industrial dynamics (see, e.g., van der Zwan 1980: 192–197; Chase-
                                                          
53 However, it is possible that it will remain, if we measure the current prices in the prices of gold.  
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Dunn and Grimes 1995: 407–409). One of the main reasons is, of course, insuf-
ficient data on the pace of economic growth in earlier periods. But more im-
portantly, that the data that do exist, cannot demonstrate the existence of global 
long-wave oscillations until the middle of the 19th century (see, e.g., Poletaev 
and Saveljeva 1993: 221; Korotayev and Tsirel 2010a). We can assume that 
this is not accidental, as rising prices and GDP growth can develop in certain 
periods in different directions (see our analysis of the causes of price trends and 
changing trends in the increases/decreases of the profit rates below). Similarly, 
there are some doubts that K-waves can be traced in the dynamics of global 
GDP in the period up to 1870, though in this period they had been apparently 
present in the economic macrodynamics of the West (Korotayev and Tsirel 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Grinin and Korotayev 2010b: 240).  
Nevertheless, our analysis of the dynamics of K-waves for over two hun-
dred years suggests that within this apparent incompatibility one may still trace 
some organic link, if we assume that the factors that define K-wave phases 
change (at least, according to their importance) in a natural way. K-waves 
change their manifestations in connection with the development of industrial 
production, as well as with the expansion of the World System and the World 
System links. In addition, the role of the state grows. It is worth noting that  
J. J. van Duijn puts forward a very plausible hypothesis, stating that long waves 
in economic growth emerged in the second half of 19th century, replacing long 
waves in price movements (van Duijn 1983: 91). 
If we accept the idea of natural changes in the K-wave factors, it allows 
us to move to an organic synthesis of all the major theories explaining  
K-waves through monetary, technological, investment, external and military 
factors. Note that during the A-phase of the 1st K-wave the upward trend in 
prices was mostly caused by the war (in fact, it lasted for more than two 
decades – from 1792 to 1815) and the continental blockade policy. But then 
we observe a gradual transition from exogenous factors generating long 
waves to endogenous trends related to innovation, large investments and the 
alteration of technological paradigms. 
This also accounts for contradictions of the upswing and downswing phas-
es of the 1st K-wave connected with the transition from one type of reasons 
determine price fluctuations, to another – namely the replacement of purely 
external factors with a symbiosis of internal factors associated with the growth 
of labor productivity with external factors. This may explain the meaning of a 
rather strange initial assertion when the phase associated with endless Napole-
onic wars is declared upward, and the next phase (associated with the industrial 
revolution, [see Grinin 2007a], the most powerful economic restructuring and a 
huge increase in productivity) is declared to be downward.  
But of course, such a change of the driving forces of long-term trends 
could not be either rapid or complete. During the downward phase of the first 
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K-wave changes were really severe in only one country (Great Britain), but this 
could not change completely the trend towards lower prices in Europe, which was 
also caused by a very rapid increase in labor productivity, reducing production 
costs of manufactured products. But already the next K-wave was caused not 
only by external factors (wars and expansion of gold production), but also by a 
change in the global trading system (the transition to the principles of free trade). 
This eliminated the narrowness of foreign markets and led to powerful invest-
ments in many different countries. We also note the emergence of a more com-
plex system of industry (heavy and light) and the creation of new transport as 
well as information and communication technologies (railroads and telegraph). 
On the one hand, the transition to the 2nd K-wave A-phase precisely in the 
early 1850 was to a certain extent a contingency since it coincided with the 
discovery of gold deposits in California and Australia, which gave a powerful 
upward momentum. If we take the period between 1814 and 1847, then we 
would not have been surprised if this phase had started, say, in 1842 and a long 
upswing had begun. This upswing actually started and, in particular, due to 
expectations of demand on the part of the Chinese market, so that there was 
even an acute shortage of workers (see, e.g., Tugan-Baranovsky 2008 [1913]: 
122), but the famine of 1845–1846 suspended it.54 And during this time oppor-
tunities for new growth had improved.  
Note that the rise provides sufficiently large reserves to become really long 
if it is accompanied by the expansion of the World System's core (and, hence, 
semi-periphery's catch-up).  
It seems that the price changes as the main K-wave indicator started to be 
replaced by the fluctuations in economic growth rates sometime in the early 
20th century. This, in particular, is reflected in the competition of Britain and 
Germany. Finally, this became clear after the World War I and the postwar cri-
sis of 1920, and it is no accident that in the period preceding the Great Depres-
sion, prices barely rose (see Grinin and Korotayev 2010b: 123–125; Haberler 
2008: 9–10, 28 for more detail), which even was a cause of some forecast er-
rors. Such a radical change in the oscillation factors coincided (but not coinci-
dentally): a) with an almost complete expansion of the World System; b) with 
the change of its leader; c) the weakening of the gold standard; and d) the fact 
that the industry, including the heavy industry, began to play a decisive role in 
the pace and direction of economic growth.  
Change of the role of the state  
During the 19th century the role of the state changed significantly: it stops being 
neutral, as states become more and more interested in high economic growth 
rates (some states showed interest in the development of trade and industry quite 
                                                          
54 This is evidenced, e.g., by the following fact: in 1845–1847 the share of food in the British im-
port grew from 3 % to 50 % (Trakhtenberg 1963: 155). 
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long ago, in particular, parliamentary commissions in England analyzed reasons 
for the decline of industry during the 1825 crisis, see e.g., Tugan-Baranovsky 
2008 [1913]). Prior to this, states at best cared for maintaining stability of the 
currency and government securities, and partly for the construction of communi-
cations. We should also note the state's role in the development of military tech-
nology and military orders. Starting from the Great Depression the economic 
growth became one of the main concerns of the state. 
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